The Impact of External Ators Activities in Affecting Civil War Duration in Syria
Keywords:
Civil War, Assad Regime, Regional Actor, International Actor, and Transnational Actor.
Abstract
This research aims to further explore the civil war that is taking place in Syria. This paper questions fundamentally, why did the civil war in Syria become a prolonged armed conflict? Or are there other factors that strengthen the strength of their resistance? This research offers a novelty of research on the situation of this conflict, is that the prolonged civil war in Syria is not only caused by internal conditions, but also the involvement of external actors. As with the approach of David E. Cunningham (2010) that the involvement of external actors in civil war produces two possibilities, namely; become a negotiating facilitator and help one party win. This research reveals that the involvement of external actors interventions - regional, international and transnational – actually prolongs the conflict. This is because the involvement of external actors causes the addition of combatants in the conflict, so the preference in the conflict increases.
References
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25. Stewart, P., & Holton, K. (2015, October 9). U.S. pulls plug on Syria rebel training effort; will focus on weapons supply. Retrieved April 12, 2017, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa/u-s-pulls-plug-on-syria-rebel-training-effort-will-focus-on-weapons-supply-idUSKCN0S31BR20151009
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27. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/dictator-son-assad-grip-power
28. Valenta, J., & Valenta, L. F. (2016). Why Putin Wants Syria. Middle East Quarterly , 23 (2).
2. Alsharif, A. (2012, June 23). Saudi Arabia and Qatar funding Syrian rebels. Retrieved April 2, 2017, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-syria-crisis-saudi/saudi-arabia-and-qatar-funding-syrian-rebels-idUSBRE85M07820120623
3. Amnesty International. (2016, February 3). Syria's refugee crisis in numbers. Retrieved April 4, 2017, from https://www.amnesty.org/en/latest/news/2016/02/syrias-refugee-crisis-in-numbers/
4. Bagdonas, A. (2012). Interest in Syrian Conflict: Power, Prestige, and Profit Power, Prestige, and Proft. European Journal of Economic and Political Studies , 55-77.
5. Barfi, B. (2016, January 24). The Real Reason Why Iran Backs Syria. Retrieved April 2, 2017, from : https://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-real-reason-why-iran-backs-syria-14999
6. Barmin, Y. (n.d.). A Short History of Syria’s Brutal First Family. Retrieved December 16, 2016, from https://mic.com/articles/62771/a-short-history-of-syria-s-brutal-first-family#.TgA5p6x20
7. Basma, A., & Strohecker, K. (2015, November 15). Saudi Arabia to continue support Syrian rebels if Assad does not leave. Retrieved 3 April, 2017, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-saudi/saudi-arabia-to-continue-support-syrian-rebels-if-assad-does-not-leave-idUSKCN0T31A320151114
8. Bassam, L., & Perry, T. (2015, November 7). Saudi Arabia's 'intensified' support to Syrian rebels is reportedly slowing regime advances. Retrieved April 3, 2017, from https://www.businessinsider.com/saudi-arabias-intensified-support-to-syrian-rebels-is-reportedly-slowing-regime-advances-2015-11?IR=T
9. Cafarella, J., Heras, N. A., & Casagrande, G. (2016, September 1). Al Qaeda Is Gaining Strength in Syria. Retrieved April 19, 2017, from https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/09/01/al-qaeda-is-gaining-strength-in-syria/
10. Cafiero, G., & Wagner, D. (2015, November 8). U.S. and Iranian Interests in Syria. Retrieved April 8, 2017, from http://intpolicydigest.org/2015/11/08/u-s-and-iranian-interests-in-syria/
11. Cassidy, J. (2015, November 3). America's Vital Interests in Syria. Retrieved April 8, 2017, from https://www.newyorker.com/news/john-cassidy/americas-vital-interests-in-syria
12. Collier, P., Hoeffler, A., & Rohner, D. (2009). Beyond Greed and Grievance: Feasibility and Civil War. Oxford Economic Papers , 61 (1), 1-27.
13. Cunningham, D. E. (2010). Blocking resolution: How external states can prolong civil wars. Journal of Peace Research , 47 (2), 115-127.
14. Fulton, W., Holliday, J., & Wyer, S. (2013, May). Iranian Strategy In Syria. Retrieved 2 April, 2017, from http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf
15. Gleditsch, K. S. (2007). Transnational Dimensions of Civil War. Journal of Peace Research , 44(3), 293-309.
16. Issa, A. (2016, October 13). Is War in Syria is America Interest? Retrieved April 7, 2017, from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/war-syria-americas-interest-18037?page=2
17. Lister, C. (2015, May 31). An internal struggle: Al Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate is grappling with its identity. Retrieved April 22, 2017, from https://www.brookings.edu/blog/markaz/2015/05/31/an-internal-struggle-al-qaedas-syrian-affiliate-is-grappling-with-its-identity/
18. Lister, C. (2016, November 26). The Free Syrian Army: A decentralized insurgent brand. Retrieved March 13, 2018, from https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/iwr_20161123_free_syrian_army1.pdf
19. O'bagy, E. (2012). Jihad In Syria. Washington DC: Institute for the Study of War.
20. Pakhomov, N. (2015, November 18). What Does Russia Really Want in Syria? Retrieved April 5, 2017, from http://nationalinterest.org/feature/what-does-russia-really-want-syria-14375?page=2
21. Rafizadeh, M. (n.d.). The Syrian Civil War: Four Concentric Forces of Tensions. Retrieved
22. March 17, 2017, from https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=7008&context=etd
23. Regan, P. M., & Norton, D. (2005). Greed, Grievance, and Mobilization in Civil Wars. The Journal of Conflict Resolution , 49 (3), 319-336.
24. Rodgers, L., Gritten, D., Offer, J., & Asare, P. (n.d.). Syria: The story of the conflict. Retrieved December 16, 2016, from https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-26116868
25. Stewart, P., & Holton, K. (2015, October 9). U.S. pulls plug on Syria rebel training effort; will focus on weapons supply. Retrieved April 12, 2017, from https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-usa/u-s-pulls-plug-on-syria-rebel-training-effort-will-focus-on-weapons-supply-idUSKCN0S31BR20151009
26. The Guardian. (n.d.). Like dictator, like son: how the Assads maintain a tight grip on power.
27. Retrieved March 17, 2017, from https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/mar/14/dictator-son-assad-grip-power
28. Valenta, J., & Valenta, L. F. (2016). Why Putin Wants Syria. Middle East Quarterly , 23 (2).
Published
2020-05-18
How to Cite
Dagalo, A. (2020). The Impact of External Ators Activities in Affecting Civil War Duration in Syria. International Journal of Science and Society, 2(2), 306 - 316. https://doi.org/10.54783/ijsoc.v2i2.160
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