

Wahyu Hidayat's Terrorism Financing Deradicalization Strategy

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Abstract

The deradicalization programme is mandated by Law No. 5/2018, especially in approaching prisoners of terrorism. The deradicalization programme is carried out so that prisoners abandon their acts of violence and crime and even abandon radical thoughts or ideologies. This programme is implemented both inside and outside the prison. This research reveals the deradicalization program experienced by terrorism convict Wahyu Hidayat. This research is qualitative research with a case study research type. The primary data in this research are interviews with Wahyu Hidayat, Densus 88 Anti-Terror Polri investigators and BNPT deradicalization personnel. The results of this research show that, currently, the disengagement program for Wahyu Hidayat has succeeded in making him leave his group, Wahyu Hidayat is still in prison in the stage of developing his identity and social reintegration with various programs. Based on this, the rapid change in Wahyu Hidayat's attitude needs to be a precaution for BNPT in conducting identification as an initial stage of deradicalization, as well as the need for a sustainable program to ensure Wahyu Hidayat does not re-offend.

Keywords: *Deradicalization, Disengagement, Prisoners.*



A. INTRODUCTION

The approach to dealing with terrorism in Indonesia has changed after changes in regulations on eradicating and countering terrorism through the emergence of Law Number 5 of 2018 concerning Amendments to Law Number 15 of 2003 concerning the Stipulation of Government Regulations in place of Law Number 1 of 2002 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism to become Constitution (Hamzani, 2020). One of the changes in the approach made is by running a deradicalization program. Deradicalization is carried out through collaboration between institutions, namely Densus 88 Anti-Terror, Ministry of Law and Human Rights (Kemenkumham), especially the Directorate General of Correctional Centers (Ditjen Lapas) as well as leading the deradicalization sector, namely the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT) (Rachmayanthy et al., 2020).

The number of terrorism convicts (napiters) in Indonesia, according to BNPT data, is 1,290. Of this number, 8% refuse to participate in the deradicalization program, and only about 120 are unwilling to participate in the government's program. In Indonesia, the phases of deradicalization are separated into within and outside of prisons. Identification, rehabilitation, re-education, and reintegration are the stages in confinement (Anisa & Syauqillah, 2023). In Indonesia, the BNPT manages the deradicalization program, specifically the Deputy I for Prevention, Protection, and Deradicalization, who oversees the program's various phases. Adikara, Zuhdi, and

Purwanto explained that deradicalization by the BNPT began with a process of identification using the Radicalism and Terrorism Measurement Tool (AKURAT) to assess terrorist ESTOMs both inside and outside of prisons through interview and observation techniques. Based on the identification results, the BNPT classified inmates into the five categories described by Arham and Runturambi as red, pink, orange, yellow, and green, with red indicating the highest risk and green the lowest (Purwawidada et al., 2022). Rehabilitation is the next program. According to Adikara, Zuhdi, and Purwanto, there is currently a program that prepares incarcerated individuals for economic independence upon release. According to Adikara, Zuhdi, and Purwanto, personality development is conducted by the BNPT in collaboration with religious experts, psychologists, and ex-convicts who are cognizant of their religious beliefs (Sumpter et al., 2021). The ultimate phase is reintegration into society. This stage is significant in deradicalization, according to Adikara, Zuhdi, and Purwanto, because it determines how society accommodates criminals. As a follow-up to the social reintegration program, the BNPT collaborates with the Regional Government, Perhutani, business actors, BUMN, and other Ministries/Institutions (K/L) to empower and assist convicted individuals who are participating in the deradicalization program (Anindya, 2019). Meanwhile, Fitriana, Utomo, and Pattipelohy described the deradicalization program outside prisons as a program for vulnerable prisoners and their families that offers economic independence programs, assistance in the process of reintegration and resocialization with society, and measures to prevent ex-convicts from committing terrorist acts again (Subagyo, 2021).

One of the achievements of the deradicalization program implemented by the government is the pledge of allegiance to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia by convicts. From January to December 2022, the Directorate General of Pas, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, noted that 108 convicts pledged allegiance to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Prisoners in Arham's research stated that culture, which consists of the lifestyle, clothing and language of convicts in prison, forms a separate subculture, making this group have a strong identity and can even become an organization or cell capable of recruiting (Wahyudi et al., 2022). Meanwhile, Naldo said convicts are accustomed to being indoctrinated with an exclusive understanding of religion, considering their group to be the most correct, hostile to groups with opposite views, so they become individuals who tend to be closed, including those with different views or beliefs. This rejection includes the government system in Indonesia, which runs a democratic system with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution as the basis of the state. Regarding the characteristics of convicts, the NKRI pledge is an indicator of a change in attitude. Rini and Kurniawan mentioned the pledge to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia as one of the indicators of a change in convicts who have left extreme understandings and accepted the teachings of the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and become a complete part of implementing Pancasila values (Tirza & Cendana, 2022).

One convict who declared his allegiance to the Republic of Indonesia was Wahyu Hidayat (WH), a convict in the terrorism financing case who was arrested on

April 2, 2021. In the Supreme Court Decision Number 1032/Pid.sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim-Wahyu Hidayat, WH, was arrested for their involvement in funding Jemaah Islamiyah (JI) through the non-profit organization (NPO) Syam Organizer (SO). WH was previously a teacher at the Cilacap State Polytechnic who was interested in becoming an SO volunteer in 2013. At the start of his involvement in the Tabligh Akbar activities of SO, WH and the Cilacap Regional Syam Organizer (SODA) team managed to collect donations from the public in the amount of IDR 50,000,000.-. In 2016, WH was invited to join a limited study group, and at the end of 2016, he pledged allegiance to Amir JI. WH is a member of JI who comes from the general public, who is recruited briefly without the recruitment stages like other JI members and is directly placed in JI's NPO unit, namely SO. During the trial, it was stated that WH was recruited because he could raise funds, so he was invited to use it to benefit the Islamic struggle.

During his arrest from April 10 2021, until the trial verdict on April 20 2022, WH was in the Central Java Police Mobile Brigade Detention Center, Central Java Police Detention Center and for 10 months before Cikeas Prison under the supervision of the Anti-Terror Densus 88, and then placed in Class II B Prison Cilacap in January 2023. WH received a deradicalization program from the Densus 88 Social Identification Team (Idensos) in collaboration with the BNPT during this period. WH has reaffirmed its loyalty to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia and signed the pledge of allegiance. The program successfully changed the perspective of convicts who previously supported terrorism through fundraising in a relatively short period. This study will explore the deradicalization strategy for WH to obtain a big picture of strengthening the deradicalization program as mandated by the law.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Terrorism

Post defines terrorism as an act of violence against noncombatants or property targets in order to achieve political, ideological, or religious objectives through fear and intimidation. Terrorism is an extraordinary crime that threatens the safety and lives of society (Scott, 2020). Action According to Brian M. Jenkins, terrorism is based on actions involving violence or threats against civil society that are publicized to instill fear and are followed by political demands made by individuals or groups. As explained by Spaaij as a social construct, terrorism arises as a result of a reaction to something that occurs in society (Chaney & Sahoo, 2020).

Terrorism will not work if it is not supported by funding, so Acharya said that funding is the blood of the terrorist movement, both in cultivating ideology, financing operations and launching attacks. The Financial Action Task Force (FATF) divides terrorism financing into three stages, namely, the stage of collecting funds from both legal and illegal sources; the second stage of transferring funds and depositing either through the financial banking system, assets or cash; and the use of funds both in the form of group operations and attacks (Levy & Yusuf, 2021).

In forming the Rabasa deradicalization model, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek mention the need for a definition that starts with a definition of radicalism, namely,

the process of adopting a belief system including the desire to use, support or facilitate violence as a method of achieving its political goals (Suyanto et al., 2022). Based on this definition, Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek define deradicalism as an attempt to persuade extremists to abandon extreme perspectives, decide that violence is unacceptable, and implement social change through habituation to following norms, rationalization to avoid aligning preferences with forced behavior, and internal dialogue capable of awakening extremists (Rahmanto & Golose, 2022).

Several studies were conducted to explore the deradicalization program for convict convicts in Indonesia. Research by Rini and Kurniawan (2019) on the revitalization program at the super-maximum prison Class II A prison, Pasir Putih, Nusa Kambangan, for convicts shows the implementation of the super-maximum security prison policy in the context of revitalizing convicts shows positive results, although it is not optimal in its implementation. Publications by Riyanta, Rahayu and Mamoto (2021) stated that deradicalization programs implemented in Indonesia have not been effective because they have not yet touched on the main causes of radicalization, problems with program funding which are considered too small, the need for community participation, reinforcement with feedback from academics and increased collaboration between institutions. A review of the implementation of the pentahelix model in the deradicalization program conducted by Subagyo (2021) demonstrates that the deradicalization program is not comprehensive and sustainable, such as the absence of the media sector, which serves to disseminate positive narratives about former terrorists to the public, and business groups, which play a role in accommodating and providing employment for ex-convicts.

In addition, research conducted by Islam (2019) on deradicalization programs in multiple nations demonstrates that deradicalization programs in Indonesia have had limited success due to a lack of financial mechanisms and commitment from relevant officials. In the research of Islam, the deradicalization approach in Indonesia tends to refer more to the provisional release of terrorists whose violent acts are successful in the short term. Indrawan and Aji also measured the efficacy of the deradicalization program, and their findings revealed that the program faced internal obstacles such as budgetary issues, limited prison facilities, and low public acceptability of ex-convicts (Ugwueze et al., 2022). Research conducted by Taufiqurochman (2021) shows that convict deradicalization programs carried out between stakeholders have been integrated, planned and systematic through deradicalization programs inside and outside prisons. Meanwhile, Widya's (2020) research shows that deradicalization programs in Indonesia must be developed not only for terrorist groups and carried out by all levels of society by developing several programs.

Many of the studies conducted by several parties above examined the successes and criticisms of deradicalization programs in Indonesia. Have not studied the processes experienced by individuals in depth. The author's research is novel in this paper's research subject, namely Wahyu Hidayat, a high-profile JI who pledged to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia relatively quickly. It is hoped that the study

of the deradicalization process for high-profile prison convicts will become a consideration in formulating deradicalization strategies and programs.

2. Disengagement Model - Deradicalization

Deradicalization and disengagement are dependent variables which, according to Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek, depend on one another. Disengagement was explained by Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek by quoting John Horgan's psychological explanation, which stated that disengagement does not mean that a terrorist is completely detached from his group, he could just be released from violent activities but changed roles to become a supporter (Corner & Gill, 2020). Based on rational choice theory, a person's change depends on motives, strategy and structure, so Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek see that deradicalization makes a terrorist change his fundamental goals, while disengagement changes behavior with considerations of profit and loss. Some criticisms of the deradicalization program arose because they were deemed unable to touch big-class terrorists, but in reality, some could be deradicalized successfully (Raets, 2022). Deradicalization is not only applied to the ideological component by changing the perspective of terrorists through religious dialogue but a dual strategy is needed by providing support for material components such as providing guaranteed employment after being released from prison. So either disengagement can reduce the desire to commit violence by no longer being involved with terror groups, followed by a deradicalization program with the long-term aim of changing ideology complemented by supporting programs. The deradicalization program in Indonesia adopts a disengagement process (Breiblid, 2021).

The process of disengagement was explained by Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek, starting with a trigger, namely something that triggers a terrorist to question his commitment to his group, things that can explain that his group's ideology is not entirely correct, or evidence that what it did not make any changes. The second process is to weigh up the pros and cons when staying with a group or leaving it based on the pull factors in the form of negative things that prevent a person from using violence, motivating factors to leave the group, and other factors that prevent a person from leaving the group (Gayatri & Kosasih, 2019). The next process is the turning point: a decision to remain in the group or leave, either with an official statement or in private. The next process is developing a new identity and social reintegration, and this stage is very vulnerable because, as Hettiarachchi stated, convicts who have just been released are prone to be re-radicalized and recruited, so a long-term strategy is needed, which is a process of continuous collaboration and involvement. Meanwhile, Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek explained that the deradicalization process was carried out to prevent convicts from returning to their group (Villacé-Molinero et al., 2021).

C. METHOD

This study employs qualitative research, as defined by Ahmadi and Rose, which examines meaning and interpretation from the perspective of the participants. Basrovi and Suwandi explained that in qualitative research, researchers are expected to sense what research subjects experience and be immersed in the context and situation that occurs. Case study research is the form of research conducted. Hancock and Algozzine explain case studies as an intensive descriptive analysis of a unit or system with space and time boundaries with individual, group or event analysis units. According to Hancock and Algozzine, case study research is expected to provide an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those involved and, according to Merriam, can influence future policies, procedures and research. This research is a case study with data collection methods carried out by interviews. Interviews were conducted with investigators from Densus 88 Anti-Terror Police and the BNPT deradicalization team to find out the background and case of WH and the deradicalization process that was given to WH while he was in Cikeas Prison and made a pledge to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. Interviews were also conducted with WH at the Class IIB prison in Cilacap. The results of these interviews then become primary data which will be supported by secondary data obtained from publications from state institutions and published research results.

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. The Case of Terrorism Funding by Wahyu Hidayat

WH was a member of JI who was recruited in a short time. IM said that WH was recruited because of his skills in speaking and attracting donors' hearts. Meanwhile, in the interview, Hidayat stated that he was recruited because of his loyalty and enthusiasm for doing SODA Cilacap activities. WH often took part in general JI studies during his time as a Cilacap SODA volunteer. In 2016, as explained in the Supreme Court Decision Number 1032/Pid.sus/2021/PN Jkt.Tim-Wahyu Hidayat, WH, participated in a special study led by Arman, a member of JI, at the Purwokerto Grand Mosque with material on the risks of struggle and an invitation to use WH's capabilities for the cause of Islam. The study meeting with Arman was held for two months, with studies on faith, *al wala wal baro*, jihad and *ushulul manhaz*. The next study was supervised by Fahri, which lasted three times with material *salamatus consciousness* and continued with interviews. The next stage was carried out by Ujang, who reinforced the previous material.

In December 2016, the WH and 15 other people stated that they joined and were loyal to JI, whose pledge was led by Krisna alias Edo in Purbalingga. The WH was placed in the JI Tabligh/Da'wah (T1) Field and active in the Syam Organizer. In 2017, WH was appointed Secretary of the Central Syam Organizer in Yogyakarta. When he was the secretary of the WH, his duty was to contact sources and help compile reports. WH is aware of a monthly flow of funds from SO to JI of IDR 150,000,000. WH said the funds came from community donations for Syria, which were sent to JI to send its members to Syria. In 2020, WH was appointed as the Main Director of the Central Syam Organizer, whose task is to raise funds from SO partners and the community

and ensure the running of all programs and activities. In his leadership, Hidayat explained that he was trying to release the relationship between SO and JI, considering that this relationship was not active after the arrest of Para Wijayanto. SO is trying to build relationships with other humanitarian agencies and improve reports to donors.

Meanwhile, Densus 88 Anti-Terror has developed an investigation after the arrest of Para Wijayanto and Suhardi, especially the Syam Abadi Amal Foundation. Based on an investigation into AD/ART, Notary and Suhardi, a relationship was found between SO and JI. Densus 88 Anti-Terror then arrested Suherman and Nur Kotho (SODA W Sumatra) for their involvement with JI and obtained the names of several JI members who were SO administrators, including Wahyu Hidayat. Densus 88 Anti-Terror then conducted a closed operation to seek information and an open operation to seek legal evidence later on April 2, 2021, at the Syam Organizer Office in Yogyakarta.

2. Wahyu Hidayat's Deradicalization Process

WH, a convict of terrorism (napiter) as Prasetya, is one of the high-profile convicts because he comes from the highly educated JI group. WH has good organizational and communication skills, so WH is communicative with officers. During his detention period, Prasetya revealed that when WH was at the Central Java Police Mobile Brigade and Central Java Police Detention Centers, he often attended religious studies organized by the National Police's Anti-Terror Detachment 88. In his daily life, the WH also interacted and discussed with other detainees who were members of JI. At the same time, Prasetya explained that Para Wijayanto, the Amir of JI who was arrested in 2019, approved or permitted all JI members to pledge to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. After obtaining permission from Para Wijayanto, WH's thinking began to change, so when he was transferred to the Cikeas Detention Center, WH was more cooperative, admitted his mistakes and then pledged the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia in that detention center.

Hidayat explained that what JI was doing in Indonesia was incorrect; in reality, JI had also become a banned organization, but the spirit towards Islam was good. In his interview, Hidayat said that he needed to deepen his religion and study first because, according to him, one of the things that made him join JI was a lack of understanding of religion. This follows Prasetyo's explanation, which revealed that WH asked for several books while at the detention center, one of which was Arabic. Hidayat explained that he would be very happy if he were guided by the government, one of which was from the Ministry of Religion. During his stay at the Cilacap Class II prison, in the first three months of his arrival at the prison, WH was not allowed to be visited by his family in person, in the second month, he was allowed to make video calls with his immediate family, and after the third month WH was allowed to meet with his family. WH gradually participated in joint religious activities commemorating religious holidays and Friday prayers. WH also interacted with JAD convicts who had pledged to the Republic of Indonesia.

3. WH's Attitude Change

WH's attitude in the Central Java Regional Police detention center was an early stage of deradicalization like Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek. The presentation of the studies submitted by Densus 88 Anti-Terror triggered a change in the WH. The study made WH question its commitment to the group. This continued with discussions among JI members and offers of several privileges to convicts who pledged the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, such as not being detained in the Super Maximum Prison and being able to meet their families. This consideration, as Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek mentioned, is a stage in which WH considers leaving or remaining in the group, on this consideration, the rational choice theory applies. The advantage the WH will get if he pledges to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia is a major consideration. This is supported by the permission given by Para Wijayanto to JI members who were caught carrying out the NKRI pledge. WH then became more cooperative, as Rabasa, Pettyjohn, Ghez, and Boucek referred to this stage as the turning point. WH broke away from his group, as seen from his communicative and collaborative testimony at trial. This release was then symbolized by the NKRI pledge at the Cikeas Detention Center, where with this pledge WH has recognized the sovereignty of the NKRI and the government and is willing to follow the laws and regulations governing it.

Currently, WH is in the stage of developing social identity and reintegration with deradicalization programs implemented at Class II B Cilacap Prison. The program that is implemented is highly dependent on the identification carried out by the BNPT using the terrorism measurement tool or AKURAT, which is compiled to identify convicts and is used as the basis for the deradicalization program that will be carried out. Simon and Sudirman stated that the assessment and classification would be a guideline for the development program and assessment of the potential for convicts to commit crimes again. Interviews and observation assess the identification process. The program given to participate in religious activities together becomes a process of finding self-identity and assisting in social reintegration. Good WH communication skills will make this process easier. The involvement of other parties, such as the Ministry of Religion, in providing religious studies will support the moderation process as part of seeking social identity and reintegration. Apart from government elements, the involvement of NGOs as part of society needs to be carried out, as Subagyo revealed the need for the involvement of academics and civil society to support the success of the deradicalization program. Although the training for convicts can be equated with the training for convicts of other criminal cases, special treatment can be given considering their risks, like Simon and Sudirman. Prisoners' communication skills enable convicts to recruit convicts for other criminal cases and other things that can be used in connection with terrorism.

4. Vigilance in the Deradicalization Process

Terrorism as a crime will adjust to the development of society as Spaaij stated that terrorism is a reaction to events that occurred before, so it is a social formation. The implication of social formation, making terrorism will adapt to the social development of society. This can be seen from how terrorism financing was carried out, which used to be done from acts of theft and now can be done with terrorism in cyberspace. Every element involved in the deradicalization program must follow this adaptive nature, including the need to update the identification measurement tool periodically to adjust the issues and modes used by terrorists.

Another thing that needs attention is the ability of prison officers to carry out the deradicalization process. Simon and Sudirman stated that one of the obstacles to the deradicalization process in prisons is the ability of prison officials to feel afraid of convicts and other abilities. Prison officers also need to know about the characteristics of terrorist groups and examples of profiling convicts to determine the patterns of guidance that will be given. Just as JI applies *tandzim siri* to hide its identity and strategy, so JI becomes a socially adaptive group, including JI convicts who have the potential to hide their goals even though they have pledged to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. As the WH has pledged to the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia, vigilance is still being exercised against it because it does not rule out the possibility that he is hiding other JI goals and strategies.

5. Deradicalization as a Continuous Process

Deradicalization cannot stop at prisons, when WH has completed his term, the process of deradicalization outside prisons must continue. This process again depends on the identification carried out by the BNPT, so it needs to be done carefully. Collaboration with local governments, relevant ministries/agencies, academics and NGOs will optimize the deradicalization program for ex-convicts. Economic assistance in jobs or capital assistance will be useful for convicts. Spiritual development through cooperation with the Ministry of Religion and moderate Islamic organizations can be carried out so that ex-convicts abandon the radical views they have believed in so far.

In addition, ex-convicts, especially the WH, must know that the state is monitoring them, in this case, the local security forces. This feeling will make the person concerned reluctant to return to his group, like Anisa and Syauqillah. Monitoring must be carried out periodically to ensure ex-convicts are at their residences and do not participate in group studies until they are willing to assist the government's deradicalization program.

E. CONCLUSION

The deradicalization process carried out by Densus 88 Anti-Terror Police, BNPT and the Directorate General of Pasture to WH has yielded good results, with the WH pledging and cooperating with officers. Currently, WH is seeking identity and social reintegration, which requires a very important role from BNPT and Lapas. Background WH with good communication skills followed by a change in WH's

attitude, which tends to be open and cooperative quickly, especially after obtaining permission from Para Wijayanto, must continue to be monitored as a form of vigilance. Identifying the BNPT is the key to determining the personality and motivation of WH and the basis for further deradicalization programs. Therefore, the use of measurement tools in the identification process needs to be supported by a process with periodic updates to adjust to the development of increasingly adaptive terrorist groups. Increasing the capacity of prison officers needs to be done in terms of communication skills, psychological approaches and knowledge about terror groups and profiling convicts to support the coaching process for terrorist convicts.

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