

Strategic Intelligence Analysis of the Threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation: Potential Vulnerability of Indonesia's National Security

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Abstract

This study addresses the issue of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, which includes the possession of chemical weapons, biological weapons, and nuclear weapons. The international community endeavors to mitigate the dangers posed by the trade in weapons of mass destruction. Changes in technology have contributed to a shift in the sources of funding for weapons of mass destruction. Financial institutions are susceptible to being utilized as a conduit for money laundering and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. There are a variety of transactional options available for money laundering and the financing of weapons of mass destruction by criminals. Financial institutions must therefore adhere to international protocols to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Interviews and documentation studies are used to collect qualitative data for this study.

Keywords: *Destruction, Proliferation, Nuclear, Financial Institutions.*



A. INTRODUCTION

The world is still not free from the threat and race of nuclear weapons. It is undeniable that nuclear is indeed a terrible weapon. Since their global introduction at the conclusion of World War II, nuclear weapons have, according to Sauer, become a fundamental issue in international politics (Hrynkow, 2019). According to Kristensen and Kuroda, the number of nuclear weapons currently owned by countries worldwide is less in quantity compared to when the Cold War was still ongoing. Nuclear weapon states, especially the United States and Russia, often claim their success in controlling their nuclear possessions (Ruff, 2022).

According to Oehlers, proliferation is the spread of weapons of mass destruction or high killing power. The spread of weapons of mass destruction needs to be watched out for because it can cause great damage and even destruction. The spread of weapons of mass destruction can occur between countries, non-state actors, and non-state groups (Aroniadou-Anderjaska et al., 2020). This deployment refers not only to weapons of mass destruction already made but also to the technology intended to produce them, the materials and materials required, and the intellectual expertise that facilitates the development of those weapons. Therefore, efforts to prevent and deal with the spread of weapons of mass destruction must be carried out seriously and planned (Gligor et al., 2022).

To prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction, a strictly enforced international protocol has now been established to regulate the spread of biological, chemical, and nuclear weapons. In addition, counter-proliferation agreements have also been enacted to control exports and prevent illicit trade in weapons of mass destruction, such as UN Security Council Resolution 1540, PSI, and other international agreements (Hughes, 2022).

In 2006, an Iranian corporation ordered sensitive "bioresearch" equipment from Norway for use in scientific laboratories, providing a clear illustration of cases of proliferation. Upon inspection, the Norwegian supplier determined that the equipment requested by the Iranian company technically exceeded the requirements for a civilian laboratory and did not suit the laboratory's physical layout (Koblentz, 2022). In the majority of instances, the proliferator must acquire these items through the formal financial system. Thus, financial institutions play a significant role in proliferation schemes. Proliferators use formal financial institutions to pay for procuring goods related to weapons of mass destruction and fundraise, launder, and transfer money related to proliferation activities (Stewart et al., 2020).

According to the Annual Report on Indonesia's Risk Assessment Against Terrorism Financing and Funding for the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (PPSPM) for 2021, the financing of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction has changed in recent years. Criminals use financial institutions as a conduit for money laundering, financing of mass destruction weapons, and financing of the media (Fomenko et al., 2020). The perpetrators have shifted from raising funds in cash using conventional methods to virtual payment instruments that can be accessed through a worldwide online network. Apart from that, the perpetrators have also switched from illegal underground methods to legal institutions to seek ways not found by law enforcers (Hashemi Joo et al., 2020).

The legal framework for handling the APU regime in Indonesia is divided into two institutions: the regulatory and supervisory agency and the law enforcement agency (Pratama & Pati, 2021). The list of institutions is as follows:

Table 1. Legal Framework for the Anti-Money Laundering Regime (AML) in Indonesia

Supervisory and Regulatory Agency	Law Enforcement Agency
1. Financial Services Authority (OJK)	1. Police
2. Indonesian Bank	2. BNN
3. Ministry of Cooperatives and SMEs	3. Director General of Customs and Excise
4. Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency	4. PPNS
5. Director General of State Assets, Ministry of Finance	5. Judge
6. Director General of General Legal Administration, Kemenkumham	
7. Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning, BPN	

8. Center for Development of Financial Professions, Ministry of Finance	
9. PPATK	

The various methods of funding and spreading weapons of mass destruction have become a global problem, so the methods adopted by Indonesia must be standardized and follow control principles determined globally and internationally. This raises questions about how strategic intelligence analyzes the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the potential vulnerabilities to national security and financial institutions' compliance with international standards.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Weapons of Mass Destruction

Weapons of mass destruction (WMD) consisting of nuclear, biological, and chemical (Nubika) are currently becoming an issue that is increasingly surfacing both outside and within the country, especially after the emergence of various biological and chemical terrors (Lentzos et al., 2020). The source of the threat from nuclear has expanded to the level of radioactive substances, therefore, the Nubika threat, originally known as NBC (Nuclear, Biological, Chemical), has now developed into CBRN (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear). With technological advances in chemistry, especially with the discovery of new explosives, the term has developed into CBRNe (Chemical, Biological, Radiological, Nuclear, explosive) (Adliene et al., 2020).

The main problem that causes Nubika to become a dire threat is its massive impact and is related to a wide range of areas of life. The development of science and technology has impacted the military world, influencing the manufacture and use of weapons. Nuclear weapons, famous for being so powerful, are still inferior to biological agents because they can reproduce themselves, are everywhere, and fall into anyone's hands (Smetana & Wunderlich, 2021).

Biological weapons are weapons that employ pathogens (bacteria, viruses, and other disease-causing organisms) to kill, maim, or paralyze the adversary. Biological weapons are frequently referred to as "poor man's nuclear weapons" due to the fact that the cost and technology required to produce them is much lower and simpler than that of nuclear or chemical weapons. Even so, its mass destruction effect is no less powerful than the two weapons before (Tumbariski, 2020). The existence of biological weapons ongoing is a threat to global peace and security that emerged before the First World War (WWI), namely by using microorganisms to cause various diseases to paralyze enemies. This problem still exists today, but with different motives and using microorganisms of the same type but with different biotypes. The target of the attack has also undergone development, which is not only attacking humans directly but is also used to paralyze a country's economy by spreading disease outbreaks in animals and plants (Kumar et al., 2023). The attackers have also changed. If a country carried it out during the pre-World War II era, it is now used by certain individuals or groups (non-state actors). However, the main problem remains

the same as before, namely the difficulty in detecting the perpetrators of an attack because biological agents can reproduce themselves (Schrader, 2022). All pathogens (biological substances that cause disease) can be used as biological weapons, but the Ministry of Health currently records at least nine infectious diseases that can potentially be used as biological weapons, namely Anthrax, Poliomyelitis, Cholera, Typhoid Fever, Tuberculosis, Avian Flu, SARS, Pulmonary Plague, and Smallpox (Nie, 2020).

2. Intelligence Analysis and Potential Vulnerabilities to National Security

Obtaining data presented as intelligence products refer to the intelligence circle scheme. The intelligence circle comprises four main elements: planning/direction, collection (gathering information), analysis (processing and producing reports), and policy-making. Thus, intelligence works in the information business (Demestichas & Daskalakis, 2020). Intelligence analysis concerning the manufacture of intelligence products is very vulnerable to information shortcuts called heuristics or shortcuts that can lead to deviations. Heuristics are the fastest way that allows someone to solve a problem and make new decisions more quickly and efficiently, but they are irrelevant and accurate (Liao & Sundar, 2022).

According to McDowell, intelligence is a broader problem-solving process involving the collection and analysis of data, interpretation, and speculative contemplation of future developments, patterns, threats, risks, and opportunities. Strategic intelligence analysis, according to McDowell, is a term used to characterize intelligence and analytical practices (Kotsias et al., 2023). Assume that all intelligence pertains to problem analysis in order to make predictions. In such a scenario, strategic intelligence takes on a distinct character that seeks to provide analysis directly related to the achievement of the overall strategic objectives of organizations, corporations, and governments. Key characteristics of strategic intelligence analysis include the extent of research, the creation of futuristic and holistic explanations and projections, and the use of analytical results as a foundation for future action planning (Mazo et al., 2022).

This strategic suddenness can appear as a risk. According to Yulianto, the risk will happen cause of the existence of a likelihood factor in the form of a threat to vulnerabilities and can harm the organization (Arimura et al., 2020). The vulnerability of PPSPM in Indonesia can be created through acts of providing funds through financial services or institutions, either in part or as a whole, acquisition of ownership, or by using biological, chemical, radiological, nuclear weapons or means of sending materials in the form of technology or materials that can be used for illegal or unauthorized purposes. Individuals and organizations engaged in the development and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction pose a grave threat to national security (Albert et al., 2021).

C. METHOD

Qualitative methods were used in this study using exploratory methods. According to Bungin, explorative qualitative research is research that examines problems that have not been studied before by other people so that researchers exploratively try to find and look for problems that arise and will be studied. The reason for using qualitative methods in this study is to facilitate the collection and processing of non-quantitative data such as interview recordings, behavioral observations, photographs or drawings, and observations between subjects and research objects. Data collection was carried out through literature studies and documentation. According to Creswell, data collection through literature studies and documentation is carried out by quoting and reading materials obtained directly or indirectly from various literary sources related to topic selection and research problems by using the reciprocal relationships of information categories. The data triangulation used is a triangulation of data sources and theory. The data that has been obtained in full is then checked for validity from various sources so that it can produce a basis for making conclusions. This technique is expected to fulfill the process of concluding. The combination of triangulation techniques is carried out simultaneously with carrying out activities in the field. Thus, this study recorded accurately and directed so that the data collected and obtained is feasible and appropriate for use (Hamzah, 2021).

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Indonesia is a serious, complex national security threat and significantly impacts national security and world peace (Zulkifli et al., 2022). Therefore, careful and reliable strategic intelligence analysis is needed to understand and anticipate these threats. Strategic intelligence analysis related to weapons of mass destruction involves gathering, analyzing, and interpreting data and information to understand better threats, risks, and trends regarding weapons of mass destruction (Barnea, 2020). As described below, several steps can be taken to conduct a strategic intelligence analysis of this threat.

1. Detecting Risks Associated with Weapons of Mass Destruction

The identification process is the step of strategic intelligence analysis to deal with the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The process of identifying and seeking information about countries, groups, or individuals who have the potential to develop and use weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, is carried out by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Police, and BAPETEN. The government, through related institutions, will identify countries, groups, or individuals who can have the capability to develop weapons of mass destruction. This can be done by monitoring suspicious activity, including purchases of materials or technology related to weapons of mass destruction and contact with groups or individuals involved in this activity. Activity monitoring tools

related to detecting the risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction can be seen in the following figure:



Figure 1. Monitoring Tools for Risk Detection of Activities Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction

Source: Bank Indonesia

Meanwhile, in terms of funding related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Data published by PPATK shows several countries with certain risk categories, which are indications of financing terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction in Indonesia (PPSPM).

Table 2. Risks of Terrorism Financing and Weapons of Mass Destruction Proliferation

Country	Inward Risk Category	Onward Risk Category
United States of America	High	Average
Malaysia	High	High
Philippines	High	High
Australia	High	High
Afghanistan	Average	Average

The government is increasing surveillance at ports and airports to prevent the entry of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons or materials that can be used for weapons of mass destruction. This is done by strengthening security, increasing the number of officers on duty, and using surveillance technology. The legal “umbrella” for identifying and preventing potential threats is contained in Government Regulation Number 29 of 2021 concerning the administration of the trade sector, which explicitly regulates procedures for controlling high-risk imported and exported goods, including weapons and chemical, biological substances, and nukes that can be used for weapons of mass destruction.

In addition, there is a Joint Regulation of the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Chief of Police, PPATK, and Bapeten No. 4, 1, 9, & 5 of 2017 regarding the Inclusion of the identities of persons and corporations on the list of funding for the proliferation

of weapons of mass destruction and the immediate blocking of funds belonging to persons or corporations listed on the list of funding for the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The result of implementing these rules is the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations (DTTOT) & Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction published by PPATK on their website. Until now, hundreds of names have continued to be updated every time.

2. Evaluating the Impact of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Once potential threats are identified, intelligence teams must evaluate their capabilities to develop, manufacture and deploy weapons of mass destruction. This evaluation can be carried out by analyzing the technological resources and capabilities available to them and activities related to developing weapons of mass destruction.

The Indonesian government has made several efforts to evaluate the possible impacts of the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Some of the steps that have been taken include:

- a. Risk analysis: The Government of Indonesia has conducted a risk analysis of potential weapons of mass destruction that may be under threat of proliferation. This analysis was carried out by various institutions such as BIN, the National Counterterrorism Agency (BNPT), and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
- b. Evaluation of the security system: The Government of Indonesia has also evaluated the existing security system to determine whether it is sufficient to deal with the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This was carried out by various security agencies such as the TNI and Polri.
- c. Simulation: The Government of Indonesia has also conducted simulations or exercises with different scenarios to evaluate the possible impacts and how to deal with them in an emergency. This includes simulations of handling weapons of mass destruction and simulations of evacuating residents from affected areas.
- d. Evaluation of cooperation: The Indonesian government has also evaluated cooperation with other countries to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This is done through bilateral and multilateral cooperation, such as cooperation with the United Nations, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and other countries.
- e. Evaluation of policy effectiveness: The Indonesian government has also evaluated the effectiveness of policies and prevention efforts implemented through laws and regulations and national policies in the security sector.

The steps above can be reflected in the legal products produced by the Indonesian government, including:

- a. Law number 15 of 2003 concerning Eradication of Criminal Acts of Terrorism: This law provides a legal basis for the government to deal with threats of terrorism, including threats from weapons of mass destruction.

- b. Law number 10 of 2014 concerning Ratification of the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism: This law regulates Indonesia's ratification of the International Convention for the Eradication of Nuclear Terrorism and provides a legal basis for the government to implement this international agreement.
- c. Law number 8 of 1978 concerning Prevention and Management of Nuclear Crisis: This law regulates the prevention and management of a nuclear crisis that may occur in Indonesia.
- d. Law number 3 of 2002 concerning National Defense and Law number 34 of 2004 concerning the TNI as a legal basis for evaluating impacts related to the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

3. Analyzing Trends and Patterns in the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

The step of strategic intelligence analysis related to the threats and risks of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the process of finding trends and patterns in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This step includes changes in the strategies and tactics used by states and non-state groups in developing and using weapons of mass destruction and efforts to expand access to the technology and resources needed to develop these weapons.

The pattern that can be analyzed in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is the tendency of certain countries to develop weapons of mass destruction as a means of national security. The United States, Russia, and China possess large quantities of weapons of mass destruction and are continuously developing new technologies to improve the performance of their weapons. Another pattern is the efforts of several countries, such as North Korea and Iran, to acquire weapons of mass destruction as a means of force.

The police and PPATK exchange information about names of people and terrorist groups with foreign agencies such as FATF and AUSTRAC. The process of analyzing trends and patterns of non-state proliferation, especially in terms of funding, produces new names that are included in the List of Suspected Terrorists and Terrorist Organizations (DTTOT) & Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction issued by PPATK.

The Indonesian government has taken several actions to analyze trends and patterns in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, such as:

- a. Signed the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT): In 1970, Indonesia became one of the signatories to the NPT. This agreement aims to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons to countries that do not yet have these weapons. Thus, Indonesia has shown its seriousness in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
- b. Taking an active role in international organizations, Indonesia has been active in various international organizations, such as the United Nations (UN), the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons, and the International

Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Through its participation in these organizations, Indonesia can gain access to the information and resources needed to analyze trends and patterns in the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- c. Implement the Law on the Control of Explosives and Firearms. This law aims to control the distribution of firearms and explosives and tighten supervision of those who possess firearms and explosives. Thus, the government can prevent the misuse of weapons of mass destruction.
- d. Cooperation with other countries: Indonesia has established cooperation with various countries, both bilateral and multilateral, to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. This cooperation includes exchanging information, training, and technology to support efforts to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction.

4. Making Policy and Strategy Recommendations

Indonesia must strengthen preventive measures and take concrete actions to deal with this threat of weapons of mass destruction. In this regard, several policy recommendations and strategies can be taken to increase the capacity and effectiveness of Indonesia’s defense system in dealing with the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

- a. Firm and effective law enforcement

The Indonesian government must tighten supervision and law enforcement against the illegal arms trade. This can be done by increasing cooperation between domestic and foreign law enforcement agencies and improving detection and security technologies at airports and seaports.

The law enforcement process consists of investigations and investigations carried out by the National Police, Prosecution by the Prosecutor’s Office, and Trials conducted by the District Court. The following are law enforcement policies that have been implemented by Law Enforcement Agencies related to the prevention of the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction:

Table 3. Policies of Law Enforcement Agencies in the Process of Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction

Institution	Form
Police	Counterterrorism Special Detachment 88/AT
	Signed a joint commitment with 13 related Ministries/Institutions (Ministry of Political, Legal and Security Affairs, Ministry of Home Affairs, Ministry of Law and Human Rights, Ministry of Religion, Attorney General’s Office, BNPT, BIN, OJK, BI, and PPATK) regarding the prevention of TF through NPOs
	Published DTTOT 2019 and 2020 updates
	Employ law enforcement against NPO officials who have been proved to be TPPT

	Incorporate several NPOs and their officials into the DTTOT list in 2020
	Baintelkam
	Conducting investigations into individuals and businesses suspected of having relations to individuals and entities on the sanction list.
	Conducting investigations into sources of funds for radical/terror groups
Attorney	The successful handling of terrorism financing offenses by the Directorate of Terrorism and Transnational Crime, including three cases in 2018, four cases in 2019, seven cases in 2020, and seven cases in 2021 (through April 2021).
Judiciary	Carry out various hearings on charges of criminal acts of terrorism and the financing of terrorism cumulatively and alternatively at the district court.
	Examined 18 cases of TPPT
PPSPM in general	Issuing a Joint Regulation by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the National Police Chief, the Head of PPATK, and the Head of the Nuclear Energy Supervisory Agency regarding the Inclusion of Individual or Corporate Identity on the List of Funding for the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, and the Immediate Blocking of Funds Owned by Individuals and Corporations Listed on the PPSPM List.
	Indonesia has also become a state party to the NPT, the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (CPPNM) and its Amendment, the Convention on Nuclear Safety, the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), the International Convention for the Suppression of the Act of Nuclear Terrorism, and IAEA Additional Protocol.

b. Increasing international cooperation

Indonesia must strengthen cooperation with countries with the same interest in overcoming the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This can be done by holding meetings between state leaders and relevant international institutions and increasing intelligence and information cooperation with countries with better technological capabilities.

1). Increasing the capacity of the defense industry

Increasing the defense industry's capacity in Indonesia can help strengthen Indonesia's defense capabilities in dealing with the threat of weapons of mass destruction. This can be done by increasing cooperation between the national and international defense industries and increasing investment in research and development of defense technology.

2). Development of surveillance technology

Increased investment in surveillance technology, such as reconnaissance radar and monitoring satellites, can help improve the detection and identification capabilities of weapons of mass destruction crossing Indonesia's borders. This can be done by increasing cooperation with international institutions with advanced surveillance technology. One example of the development of surveillance technology is the creation of the SIPENDAR information system platform, which PPATK developed to monitor and exchange information about financing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

3). Non-Proliferation Enforcement

The Indonesian government must ensure that all developments in nuclear technology and other weapons of mass destruction are carried out within a non-proliferation framework. This can be done by adopting international agreements and fully activating Indonesia's membership in international oversight bodies.

5. Compliance of Indonesian Financial Institutions with International Standards

Indonesian financial institutions have tried to improve compliance with international standards to create a more transparent, effective, and efficient financial system. As a country that has ratified several international agreements in the financial sector, Indonesia should comply with international standards in this field.

The following are some recommendations from the FATF that OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have implemented:

- a. Establishment of AML/CFT (Anti-Money Laundering/Combating the Financing of Terrorism) Policy: OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have established AML/CFT policies that comply with FATF standards. This policy establishes the necessary procedures and governance to prevent and address money laundering and terrorism financing practices in the financial sector.
- b. Risk Assessment: OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have conducted regular risk assessments to identify risks related to money laundering and terrorism financing practices in the financial sector. Financial institutions can determine the actions needed to minimize these risks by conducting a risk assessment.
- c. Transaction Reporting: OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have established regulations and transaction reporting mechanisms that financial institutions must carry out. This report is conducted to detect and prevent money laundering and terrorism financing practices in the financial sector.
- d. Customer Identity Verification: OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have established strict customer identity verification procedures to

ensure that customers served by financial institutions are real people. This aims to prevent money laundering and terrorism financing practices in the financial sector.

- e. Training and Development: OJK, PPATK, and financial institutions in Indonesia have developed training and development programs to increase awareness and knowledge about AML/CFT among staff and employees. By increasing the competence of staff and employees, financial institutions can strengthen the system for preventing and handling money laundering and terrorism financing practices in the financial sector.

Domestically, OJK, BI, PPATK, and the Commodity Futures Trading Supervisory Agency (BAPPEBTI), are implementing steps aimed at succeeding mitigation efforts and preventing the spread of weapons of mass destruction. The following are policies that have been implemented:

Table 4. TPPT and PPSPM Mitigation Efforts

Institution	Forms of Mitigation
OJK	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Issuance of POJK No: 23/POJK.01/2019 concerning Amendments to OJK Regulation number 12/POJK.01/2017 concerning Implementation of the APU-PPT Program in the Financial Sector. 2. Actively socialize the supervision of APU-PPT implementation compliance in the PJK Sector. 3. Preparation for the technical appointment for implementing the APU-PPT program in P2P lending fintech, one of which is by implementing due diligence using biometrics. P2P lending fintech will then be asked to carry out sectoral and national risk identification.
BI	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Issuance of Bank Indonesia Regulation (PBI) concerning the Application of APU-PPT for payment system service providers other than Banks and Non-Bank Money Changers following recommendation 40 of the FATF. 2. Issuance of Internal PADG related to APU-PPT supervision for administrators under the supervision and regulation of Bank Indonesia. 3. Implemented risk-based supervision and issued guidelines for the implementation of risk-based APU-PPT for administrators as well as guidelines for risk-based APU-PPT supervision for internal Banks.
Bappebti	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Issue Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency Regulation No. 6 of 2019 concerning implementing the APU-PPT Program related to Organizing the Commodity Physical Market on the Futures Exchange. 2. Issue Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency Regulation No. 9 of 2019 concerning Amendments to CoFTRA

	<p>Regulation No. 5 2019 concerning Technical Provisions for Organizing the Physical Crypto Asset Market on the Futures Exchange.</p> <p>3. Issue Commodity Futures Trading Regulatory Agency Regulation No. 2 of 2020 concerning changes to CoFTRA regulations No. 5 of 2019 concerning the technical provisions for organizing the physical market for crypto assets on futures exchanges.</p>
PPATK	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. In 2017 PPATK became part of the Team to form the DTTOT Determination Task Force with Densus 88/AT Polri, BIN, BNPT, Immigration, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 2. Increasing international cooperation, particularly with Southeast Asian nations, by means of joint analyses, bilateral meetings, and working groups. 3. Initiated the development of a platform known as SIPENDAR (Information System for Suspected Terrorist Funding), which aims to improve communication between PPATK and Ministries/Agencies regarding criminal terrorism and terrorism funding. The platform was released at the beginning of August 2021.
Indonesian National Police	<p>Under the criminal procedure code, all money laundering and terrorism financing offenses will be investigated. The Directorate of Special Economic Crimes (Tipideksus) of the Indonesian National Police is responsible for investigating money laundering, with a 20-member TPPU unit located at the National Police Headquarters in Jakarta. In addition, there are thirty regional TPPU units, each with twenty to thirty-five investigators dispersed across Indonesia. Special Detachment 88 / anti-terror, the special anti-terrorism unit of the Indonesian National Police, is in charge of terrorism financing investigations. The investigative division, including the TPT investigator, is headquartered at the Indonesian National Police Headquarters in Jakarta. Special Detachment 88 has branches and personnel in the provinces of Indonesia (including areas identified as having a high risk of financing terrorism), while the investigative division, including the TPT investigator, is headquartered at the Indonesian National Police Headquarters in Jakarta.</p>
Directorate General of Customs and Excise	<p>The Directorate General of Customs and Excise has investigators responsible for investigating customs violations and TPPU. In addition, the Directorate General of Customs and Excise is responsible for implementing the Indonesian cross-border currency-carrying declaration system (CBCC).</p>

Ministry of Law and Human Rights	Concerning the TPPU/TF regime, the Ministry of Law and Human Rights is given the mandate: (i) to regulate and carry out TPPU/TPPT supervision of notaries, (ii) as a center for registration of companies, associations, and foundations, and (ii) as the central authority to carry out MLA and extradition.
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E. CONCLUSION

The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction is a serious threat to Indonesia's national security, and the government has taken several steps to prevent the spread of these weapons in Indonesian territory. The first step is to identify and seek information about countries, groups, or individuals who have the potential to develop and use weapons of mass destruction. This process is carried out by the State Intelligence Agency (BIN), the Police, and BAPETEN, monitoring activities at borders, ports, and airports. These steps have been regulated in several government regulations so that the government has a legal umbrella and concrete steps to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Strategic intelligence analysis related to the threat and risk of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction involves searching for trends and patterns in the spread of these weapons. The Indonesian government analyzed non-state terrorist groups and took several actions, such as signing the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty, taking an active role in international organizations, implementing the law on the Control of Explosives and Firearms, and establishing cooperation with other countries to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction. In the context of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the compliance of Indonesian financial institutions with international standards is also an important factor that needs attention. Financial institutions, such as banks and other financial institutions, can be a source of funding for developing weapons of mass destruction by states or non-state groups. Therefore, Indonesian financial institutions must comply with international standards related to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of the important international standards in this regard is United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540, which asks countries to prevent the spread of weapons of mass destruction and related technology. To increase the compliance of Indonesian financial institutions with international standards in preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, synergy is needed between the government and financial institutions. The government can provide clear policies and regulations and sufficient resources to support prevention programs run by financial institutions. On the other hand, financial institutions need to strengthen internal systems and procedures to increase the effectiveness of these prevention programs.

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