

Governance Developments in Challenge Situations: A Case Study of the Governance in Aceh after 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Agreement

Hassanudin¹, Muhadjir Muhammad Darwin², Irwan Abdullah³, Agus Heruanto Hadna⁴

^{1,2,3,4}Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta, Indonesia

Email: hassanudin0965@gmail.com

Abstract

This study explored about the Governance Developments in Challenge Situations in Aceh after 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Agreement. The 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Agreement brings promise into welfare and better governance for Aceh people. However, there are problems such as welfare and governance (corrupt leaders). First, the problem of socio-economic development in Aceh after the Helsinki agreement apparently occurred not at the stage of regulation and budget support, but at the leadership stage. Second, leadership problems have persisted even though elections have been held. This is an indication of elite problems in governance in Aceh. These two backgrounds form the basis for this article to discuss the main issue of Why Aceh's Governance after Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding in 2005 has not run optimally in providing for the needs of the Acehnese people. Using quantitative and qualitative methods, this article provides the relations between political elites on good public governance. Academically, this article will be able to provide a new dimension of form of relations between political elites on good public governance. Practically, this article can provide recommendations on the form of relations between political elites that affect good public governance in the success of the Aceh Government's development programs.

Keywords: Aceh, Governance, Helsinki, Memorandum of Agreement, Leadership.



A. INTRODUCTION

Discussion about Governance in Aceh province cannot be separated by the the Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2005. The Helsinki MoU contained 6 (six) parts of the Implementation of Governance in Aceh, Human Rights, Amnesty and Reintegration of GAM into society, Security Settings, the Establishment of the Aceh Monitoring Mission, and Dispute Resolution (Kingsbury, 2015). One of the real products from the Helsinki MoU were Law of the Republic Indonesia Number 11 Year 2006 about Aceh Government in which becomes legal guidelines for development in Aceh with governance that has specificity as a special autonomy status (Law Number 11, 2006).

Several developments occurred after the regulation have been produced. *First*, there is a conflict resolution between the movement of independence from Aceh and Indonesian government with peacebuilding in the form of democracy and economic health (Ball, 2002). The resolution then was shown by the removal the symbols of conflict and replaced it with development. *Second*, the Aceh Government started to

work independently for economic restoration and welfare of the Acehese people. From a political perspective, these two attempts are a signal that the Government opens up opportunities for the growth of local democracy. The signal also has been depicted from the institutionalization of aspirations in local political parties in Aceh in which leads to an opportunity for the shifting of local political elites in Aceh (Morfit, 2007; Zulkarnaen & Suzanna, 2018).

Local political elites can be indicated by the Aceh's first post-conflict general election which was held in December 2006, was won by a couple from the independent path, namely Irwandi Yusuf and Muhammad Nazar with 768,745 (38.20%) voters (Supriadi & Hwan, 2007). Similar to that, Zaini Abdullah, who was paired with Muzakir Manaf, was elected in the 2012 with 1.327.695 suara (55,78%) voters (Syahputra & Baiduri, 2018). These figures are former separatist group activists who have the mandate to lead the people of Aceh. In addition, there are 17 Regents and 5 Mayors that got the position of Governor level, the Regional Head Elections for Regents/Mayors in Aceh.

Due to that, poverty in Aceh becomes a problem for local governments, even though there were regional elections and the implementation of the 2005 peace agreement. Leaders elected through “democratic” elections have a strong legitimacy yet its elections are not optimal in moving Aceh to implement and distribute welfare programs for the Acehese people. Development in Aceh has not been optimal in reducing poverty as well as creating job opportunities. It is an indication that Aceh Government is still far from successful in implementing Special Autonomy (Kadir, 2012; Budiono et al., 2022).

The indication itself can be looked from following graph that illustrates the realization of APBN funding support to Aceh Province in the period 2008 to 2018. This graph has been taken from the report from State Financial Accountability Study Center about One Decade of Special Autonomy Aceh Financial Year 2008-2018:




Figure 1. Graph of Realization of Special Autonomy Fund Revenue, Aceh's Original Revenue, and Balancing Fund for Fiscal Year 2008-2018 (in Rupiah)

Source: (Ananto et al., 2020)

The graph above depicts that since fiscal year 2008, Aceh has received an allocation of Special Autonomy Funds about 3.59 trillion rupiah, and its value increases every year to 8.03 trillion rupiah in the 2018. Aceh also received a Balance Fund of 2.61 trillion in 2008, and gradually to 3.74 trillion in 2018. Unfortunately, in the eleven year period the fund only provides leverage to Aceh's Original Income amounted to 0.72 trillion in 2008. The percentage of Special Autonomy Fund is 20% in 2008 and increased to 2.36 trillion in 2018 (the percentage is 29.4%). The data illustrates that the development capital is greater (more than three times) than the results obtained in the form of Aceh's original regional income.

The leverage of the Aceh Provincial Government Revenue and Expenditure Budget from 2008 to 2018 to Aceh's original regional income (PAD Aceh) was below 30%, is one indicator of the performance of the Aceh Government that has not been optimally able to meet the needs of the Acehnese people (public good). It is a signal that Irwandi Yusuf as a Governor use the budget for corruptin. The problem became more problematic when Governor Nova Iriansyah at the end of 2020 signaled that there were other problems that affected the performance of the Aceh Government besides leadership and corruption. The problem arises is the relationship between the political elites in Aceh in which affecting the implementation of Aceh's governance in implementing development programs. Therefore, good public government in Aceh Province needs to be evaluated, particularly on how the interaction between elites in Aceh do governance.

The discussion of elites in governance is interesting due to several reasons. First, the problem of socio-economic development in Aceh after the Helsinki agreement apparently occurred not at the stage of regulation and budget support, but at the leadership stage. This can be seen from the gubernatorial election which was not very democratic. Second, leadership problems have persisted even though elections have been held. This is an indication of elite problems in governance in Aceh. These two backgrounds form the basis for this article to discuss the main issue of Why Aceh's Governance After the Helsinki Peace Agreement (Memorandum of Understanding) in 2005 has not run optimally in providing for the needs of the Acehnese people, especially seeing how relations between political elites occur in Aceh. in it.

Hopefully, this article can provide repertoire in the study of relations between political elites on good public governance. Academically, this article will be able to provide a new dimension in the appropriate literature review about the form of relations between political elites on good public governance. Practically, this article can provide recommendations on the form of relations between political elites that affect good public governance in the success of the Aceh Government's development programs.

B. LITERATURE REVIEW

1. Good Public Governance

Governance is a new perspective on public administration in provide services to the people (Sedarmayanti et al., 2020). It means that the direction or administrative authority (the authoritative direction and administration) is over the people, becomes governance, goes to the process of interaction in the form of action, facts, patterns, and actives between the community and the government (the act, fact, and manner of governing) (Kooiman, 1999; Haus & Klausen, 2011).

In Indonesia governance term has several meanings, namely: 1) overnance, 2) government management, 3) government administration, 4) state administration, and 5) state administration (Mustopadidjaja, 2020). This meaning involves three pillars/stakeholder actors, namely the government, the community, and the private sector (Figure 2.1.). The relationship between the three actors must be balanced/parallel and control each other (checks and balances) to avoid mastery or "exploitation" of one actor against the others. The three actors play a role according to the values and principles contained in good governance. The private sector as the driving force of the business world plays a role create jobs and income, while the community plays a role in creation of social, economic and political interactions. The government, as the holder of power state, plays a role in implementing and creating a conducive political and legal environment for other elements in governance. This means that government agencies are expected can provide excellent service to the community (Kaufmann et al., 1999; Rhodes, 2007).




Figure 2. The Three Pillars/Actors of Good Governance

Source: (Mongan et al., 2019)

Mongan et al. (2019) provides three paradigms of government in the context of good governance, namely: 1) as a ruling process, which is marked by the dependence of the government and society to one's leadership capacity; 2) as a governing process, marked by government practices on ethical consensus between leaders and the community; and 3) as an administering process, characterized by the development of a strong legal system and comprehensive.

2. Leadership and Leadership Governance

Leadership in this context puts the scale of the organization in a method of role and method from stakeholders who can map the form of contestation of interests (political conflict). Crosby & Bryson (2018) analysis begins by compiling stakeholders in a two by two matrix according to stakeholder interest in a problem and power

stakeholders in influencing the issue. Interest is an interest that owned by stakeholders in policy making, while what is meant by power is the power possessed by stakeholders to influence or create Policy.




Figure 3. Matrix of Stakeholder's Role Analysis

Source: (Crosby & Bryson, 2018)

The explanation of the stakeholder role analysis matrix according to Crosby & Bryson (2018) is as follows:

1. Context setters, namely stakeholders who have a high influence on implementation policies but of little interest, so they have a significant risk of having to be monitored in the policy implementation process.
2. Players, namely stakeholders who are actively involved in the implementation of the policy. Stakeholders have a high importance and influence on the development of policy programs.
3. Subject, namely stakeholders who have high interests on power relation. Although they support activities, their capacity for impact maybe not. These stakeholders can become influence when forming alliances with other stakeholders.
4. Crowd, namely stakeholders who have low interests and power in the policy implementation. However, these stakeholders have influence on the outcome desirable and this is a consideration to include it in decision-making. The interests and influences that are owned will experience changes from time to time, so that needs to be taken into consideration policy executor.

C. METHOD

This research uses quantitative and qualitative methods (mix-methods). A mixed methods approach to governance Aceh in its early stages quantitative data was collected to answer research questions about elite conflict in Aceh, leadership, and policy innovation in Aceh. After data has been collected then analyzed in order to obtain an initial conclusion in the framework answer problems. This research was structured using a case study approach with a sequential model, namely a research procedure in which research uses research results from one method to another (Samsu, 2017). The mix methods model used in this study is a sequential model with an explanatory approach, where quantitative data and analysis are carried out in the first stage, followed by qualitative data collection and analysis in the second stage. The stages of this research are as follows:

1. Selection of research sites

This study limits the unit of analysis to post-government governance in Aceh implementation of the peace agreement, in particular point 1 regarding governance in Aceh. This means that observations were made on political and economic activities in Aceh in throughout the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding. The research focus is on several areas which during the conflict became the basis of GAM's struggle, namely along the east coast Aceh, starting from Banda Aceh City and Aceh Besar District, Sabang City, and Pidie District Pidie Jaya, Bireuen District, North Aceh District, Lhokseumawe City, Aceh District East, Langsa City, and Aceh Tamiang Regency which borders the Province of North Sumatra.

2. Data Collection

The first is carried out with a literature study related to secondary research data. The literature that is of concern to researchers is obtained from books and objects of historical value related to research problems, published reports and journals, as well as media publications as a real form of reintegration activities. The second is research observation. Observations are made of the entire development process as a form of implementation of the 2005 Helsinki Memorandum of Understanding, so that in this case the researcher will act as a bricoleur (Denzin, 1994). The third is a survey, carrying out investigations, examinations or reviews of certain objects to obtain data for research purposes. The fourth is structured interviews, namely structured interviews with prepared guide questions, unstructured interviews without the use of prepared guide questions, and open-ended interviews.

3. Sample Collection

The population in this research on Aceh governance includes the entire province of NAD, which consists of 18 districts, 5 cities and the capital city of Aceh Province itself. Upon consideration area and relatively long research time span, namely 2005 to 2021 (16 years), the researchers used a purposive sampling technique (purposive samples). Samsu (2017) explains that purposive sampling is a sampling technique with special considerations so that data from research results made to be more representative. In this study, a purposive sampling technique was carried out by grouping the population into several groups that were considered uniform (clusters) and then within the clusters samples were taken so that the sample distribution represented the population. From a number of 18 districts and 5 cities, the researchers categorized them into four clusters, namely the eastern part of Aceh (East Coast), the western part of Aceh (West Coast), and the central part of Aceh (Gayo Highlands), as well as the capital city of Aceh Province.

4. Data Analysis and Validation

The data analysis technique used in this study is descriptive analysis, namely by describing and interpreting the data from each aspect studied. The results of this study are in the form of quantitative data and qualitative data. Quantitative data

obtained will then be presented in the form of data descriptions. The data analysis technique for this research will use the help of the SPSS (Statistical Program for Social Science) 21.0 for Windows program to find out the mean, median, mode, standard deviation, and range for each aspect studied. The data that has been analyzed is then made up of criteria by using a variable trend table to see the respondents' perceptions of several issues that are research questions. The data that has been analyzed, then made a criteria by using a table of variable tendencies to see the intensity.

D. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. Dynamics of Political Elite Behavior in Aceh Governance Post the 2005 Helsinki MoU

Result and discussion of this article were based on the several regions which can be seen from table below which taken from the research report on the Study of Governance in Aceh after MoU Helsinki in 2005:

Table 1. Research Sampling and Sharing

No	Cluster	Regency	Sub-district	Sample	
				Questionnaire	Interview
1	Capital of the Province	Banda Aceh	Ulee Kareng	10	20
			Lueng Bata	10	20
		Aceh Besar	Indrapuri	5	20
			Kota Jantho	5	20
2	East	East Aceh	Peureulak	5	20
			Idi Rayeuk	5	20
		North Aceh	Nisam	5	20
			Seunudon	5	20
3	Middle	Middle Aceh	Bintang	5	20
			Bebesan	5	20
		Pidie	Batee	5	20
			Tiro	5	20
4	West	West Aceh	Johan Pahlawan	5	20
			Samatiga	5	20
			Darul Hikmah	5	20
		Aceh Jaya	Hikmah	5	20
			Indra Jaya	5	20
Total Sample				90	320

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

Therefore, the result and discussion will be based on the sampling above in which leads to the presentation of quantitative and qualitative data, even though the main analysis will be used qualitative data. Based on the result, the intensity of Independent Movement of Aceh into two groups (senior was based on Malik Mahmud dan young was based on Irwandi Yusuf) in 2006 became the main historical

context to analyze the competition and conflict between elites in Aceh. Formed political contestation and competition as a result of Independence movement from the conflict series and violence in the past, was made elections as the area of contestation in all regions.




Figure 4. Conflict Intensity between Political Elites

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

From the graph above, the City of Banda Aceh has a high intensity potential regarding the emergence of competition and conflict between political elites. Political elites at the provincial and district levels in Banda Regency have relatively high conflict intensity. Meanwhile, in Central Aceh district, the intensity of conflict between provincial political elites and district political elites was the lowest with percentages of 36.5% and 32.8% respectively. The data above also shows that conflicts between political elites are mostly played by provincial political elites. This phenomenon becomes rational because the City of Banda Aceh is the center of the provincial government which allows for a higher intensity of interaction between provincial and city political elites.

The phenomenon of inter-elite conflict needs to be understood to what extent conflict actions emerge. Political conflict is often manifested in the form of violence. Zainal (2022) defines violence as an open or closed and aggressive or defensive behaviours. Thus, violence based on its form can be identified as open violence and closed violence.




Figure 5. The Rivalry of Political Elites in the Implementation of Physical Violence

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

In the midst of the conflict between elites in Aceh, open violence or physical violence emerged in various areas. This physical violence appears as a negative excess of elite competition involving residents. In general, the competition between political elites who use physical violence within Acehese society is relatively low, below 50%. Perceptions of physical violence as a whole in Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam Province were 10.9% for provincial political elites and 10% for district/city political elites. Of the four districts/cities, West Aceh District is the area that has the highest perceptions regarding practices of physical violence in the competition of political elites. This perception is approximately twice as high as the public's perception of the practice of violence in the Province of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam.




Figure 6. Information of the Disputes between Political Elites

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

Next, the Acehese people's knowledge of disputes can be traced through information obtained by the people in their district. From the data above, there are 71.20% of the people in East Aceh who receive information about disputes between elites in the struggle for power. The large percentage at the same time shows that the dissemination of information regarding inter-elite disputes mostly arises from or originates from East Aceh. This data is interesting when elaborated with data on conflict intensity and violent practices by political elites. As a region that receives the highest information on disputes, East Aceh is the region with the lowest perception of the practice of physical violence. Meanwhile, when juxtaposed with data:




Figure 7. The Possibility of Conflict in the Political Contest (Non-Security Threat of Political Contest in Aceh)

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

Disputes between elites, there is a straight comparison where East Aceh is in second place after Banda City which is the highest area with perceptions of disputes between political elites. From this comparative data it can be seen that the violence that occurred in East Aceh in general very little led to political violence. Perhaps the conflict in East Aceh was of the nature of covert violence or the people received news rumors that were transmitted from the general public.

The momentum of the general election (electoral) which is the arena for the battle of the political elite which often involves the community and has a destructive impact on the safety and comfort of the citizens. From the democratic parties in Aceh at various levels, both the village head election (Geuchik), the regent/mayor election, the governor election, and the presidential election which was held last time, the majority of people think that this momentum does not threaten the harmony and peace of relations between citizens. In the village head election, 90.94% of respondents stated that they did not criticize relations between residents, while 9.06% felt threatened.

In the 2019 election contestation, the percentage of threats decreased. Respondents who said they were not threatened became 80.31%, and respondents who felt threatened increased to 18.75%. The data above has a pattern where the greater the desire for democracy, the greater the perception as a moment that poses a threat. This can be seen from the increase in the number of respondents who stated that there was a threat that relations between residents would become disharmonious. This phenomenon can be understood that the political elite in the region determines the size of the conflict and indirectly determines how big the threat is to the harmony of relations between citizens. The greater the reach of the power of the political elite, the greater the potential for mass mobilization resulting in fragmentation within society which threatens social cohesion.

2. Actor Relations in Post-Helsinki MoU Aceh Governance in 2005

Furthermore, it becomes important in assessing the extent to which the concept of actor relations can comprehensively view governance in Aceh after the 2005 Helsinki MoU. Regarding the various forms of relationships that exist or arise in the concept of governance (Governance) when the Government of Aceh is dependent on other parties or when play little or no role at all. Not only do rules play an important role in governance, but it is also necessary to emphasize how the relations of political elite actors work within the social development system of the people in Aceh in an institutional setting.




Figure 8. Actor Maps and Situational Leadership Style of Aceh Government in Supporting the Social Social Development after the 2005 Helsinki MoU

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

If we look at the roles of actors in the matrix chart above, actors in the Key Player quadrant have quite high interests, influence, support and direction in improving governance and social welfare of the people in NAD. Meanwhile, actors in the context setter quadrant are those who have high influence in supporting development and social welfare in NAD, but they do not have strong enough interest, support and direction to do so. while the actors in the subject quadrant are those who have high interest and support for the success of social development and community welfare in NAD, but they do not have a strong influence to make this happen. Finally, the actors in the Crowd quadrant are those who do not have strong interests, influence, support and direction to create progress and social welfare in NAD. So actors in the Key Player quadrant need to engage and encourage actors in other quadrants to jointly realize good governance in NAD after the 2005 Helsinki MoU. This is important to do is to create successful development and social welfare in NAD.

Furthermore, the tendency regarding public perceptions in seeing power relations between political elites in Aceh after the implementation of the Helsinki agreement, it is important to see reality in the field through the results of the data processing below which explains how level of working relations between actors in Aceh itself.

	Governor	Regent/Mayor	Deputy Regent/Deputy Mayor	Speaker of the DPR	Head of Political Party	Religious Leaders	Public Figure
Governor	↓ 6,6	↘ 6,7	↓ 6,6	↓ 6,5	↓ 6,6	↗ 7,3	⇒ 7
Regent/Mayor	↓ 6,6	⇒ 6,9	⇒ 7	↘ 6,8	↑ 7,4	↗ 7,2	
Deputy Regent/Deputy Mayor	↓ 6,5	↘ 6,8	⇒ 6,9	↘ 6,8	↑ 7,4	↗ 7,2	
Speaker of the DPR	↓ 6,4	⇒ 6,9	⇒ 6,9	↘ 6,8	↑ 7,4	↗ 7,2	
Head of Political Party	↓ 6,4	↘ 6,7	↘ 6,8	⇒ 6,9	↑ 7,3	↗ 7,1	
Religious Leaders	⇒ 7	↗ 7,1	↗ 7,1	↗ 7,2	⇒ 7	↑ 7,4	
Public Figure	↘ 6,8	⇒ 7	⇒ 7,1	↗ 7,1	⇒ 7	↑ 7,5	

Figure 9. The Level of Working Relationship between Figures of NAD

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

The working relationship between executive agencies at the provincial and district/city levels has received a declining perception from the public. The community views the governor's relationship with the district head and the city as declining when compared to conditions prior to the Helsinki Agreement in 2005. In addition, the executive branch in the province or the governor also does not have a good working relationship with the regional parliament and political parties. In simple terms, this public perception can be interpreted that there is political instability in the context of local government institutions in Aceh due to fractured relationships between political actors. If this relationship continues, the performance of local governments at various levels of the chain of command is very likely to lead to policy inefficiencies.

Then the relationship of political actors with religious leaders and community leaders experienced increase when compared to conditions prior to the Helsinki Agreement. Generally, working relations between governors, regents/walkot, wabup/wawalkot, chairman of the DPR, and chairman political parties with religious and community leaders have scores ranging from 7.0 to 7.5. Within the spectrum of perceived values, it can be interpreted that political actors tend to actively establish good working relationships with religious leaders and figures Public. On the other hand, the level of perception of work relations from religious leaders and figures society to the above political actors tend to be greeted with a reasonable perception or relatively common.

Looking at the reality on the ground and analyzing the results of data processing, it can be seen that harmonization of relations in the administration of the state needs to be reviewed in order to understand how the effectiveness of governance works. From the data above, it can be seen that the relationship between governors and political figures has decreased when compared to conditions prior to the Helsinki Agreement. Interestingly, religious figures and Community leaders have a good relationship with political figures. On the other hand, competition contestation within local government bodies is very thick, but it exists efforts of political actors to navigate the social and political environment by building good working relationship.

Table 2. The Preferences of Political Elites in Conducting Conflict Resolution in NAD

Activities	West Aceh		East Aceh		Central Aceh		Banda		Aceh	
Carrying out deliberation	72,0	76,7	73,2	75,6	61,1	61,6	44,2	46,4	61,4	63,8
Handling over to the traditional leader	5,4	5,6	1,2	1,2	5,3	8,1	27,4	20,9	11,0	9,07
Seeking out resolution through political pathway	10,8	7,8	9,8	8,5	11,6	11,1	18,6	23,6	13,1	13,4
Handling over to the court/law	7,5	5,6	4,9	4,9	6,3	6,1	8,8	7,3	7,0	6,0
Conducting mass mobilization/demonstration	2,2	2,2	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,0	0,9	1,8	0,8	1,0
TT	2,2	2,2	11,0	9,8	15,8	13,1	0,0	0,0	6,8	6,0
Total	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0	100,0

Source: (MDKIK SPs UGM, 2022)

If you look at the data, Aceh's political elite quite rarely chooses to resolve conflicts at the local level provinces or districts/cities by mobilizing masses for demonstrations and so forth. This can be seen in the percentage which only reached 2.2%. political elites at the provincial level and also at the district/city level. If referring to data below, the political elite in NAD often resolve problems or conflicts through deliberation. This is due to the culture and culture of the NAD people. So that when there is a problem or conflict, it is more effective if it is resolved by consensus deliberation together. In a sense, NAD's political elite needs to sit together with the community to

find solutions or middle ground for existing problems. In Central Aceh, the political elite still choose the consensus deliberation option as a middle way which is often used to resolve conflicts. This can be seen in the percentage data which reached 61.1% at the provincial political elite level and 61.6 at the district/city level elite.

Slightly different from conflict resolution in other areas, the percentage of consensus options in the Banda area is less than 50%. If you look at the data, the percentage in deliberations for consensus is only 44% at the provincial political elite level and 46.4 in the districts/cities. Whereas in the option of handing over to traditional elders, the Banda area is more frequent than other regions, with percentages of 27.4% and 20.9%. Meanwhile, slightly different from conflict resolution in other areas, the percentage of deliberation for consensus options in the Banda area is less than 50%. If you look at the data, the percentage in deliberations for consensus is only 44% at the provincial political elite level and 46.4 in the districts/cities. Whereas in the option of handing over to traditional elders, the Banda area is more frequent than other regions, with percentages of 27.4% and 20.9%.

E. CONCLUSION

Prior to the 2005 Helsinki MoU, the governance in NAD had not been providing optimal services to the community. This failure affects the performance of the Aceh government in carrying out the development to help achieve people's

welfare. Moreover, several conflicts still arising between political elites in NAD indicate that the financial management and governance has not been maximally conducted. In order to catch up, the regional officers and secretaries need to improve Aceh's excess budget financing. This requires the role and support of actors in the Key Player quadrant to carry out engagement between relations of actors in the context setter, subject, and crowd quadrants within the NAD government. It is being conducted to create harmonization of governance in NAD so that it can run more effectively. Thus, the relationship between the governor and his political actors can be better established to achieve optimal governance in NAD.

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