

Terrorism in Egypt: Analysis of the Narrative of Post-Arab Spring Terrorism

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ABSTRACT

Since the start of Arab Spring, the Middle East has witnessed the escalation of terrorism acts. Egypt even entered the emergency zone of terrorism after the fall of Muhammad Mursi from the presidency. Various groups of terror emerged in Egypt, among them is Anshar Bayt Al Maqdis who later joined ISIS and renamed Wilayat Sinai. This paper aims to analyze the transformation of terrorist groups by using instrumental and organizational theory. The findings of this research are that the ABM group is a transformation of pre-existing terror groups. It develop the organisation through delivering benefits, affiliations, competition, recruitment of members who use religious doctrine and take advantage of the economic and political conditions in the Sinai region.

Keywords: *Anshar Bait Al Maqdis, Arab Spring, Egypt, Muslim Brotherhood, terrorism*



A. INTRODUCTION

The Arab Spring storm left a lot of homework for Middle Eastern countries in the form of changing the constellation of state life, especially in the political field, in the region (BHP UMY, 2016). The same thing was said by Prof. Dr. Muhammad Al Mestiri who stated that there were new problems that must be faced by countries that experienced the Arab Spring, namely the emergence of Islamic movements in various Muslim-majority countries, (BHP UMY, 2016). Through mass protests against the ruling regime, Tunisia and Egypt succeeded in carrying out a political revolution and succeeded in overthrowing a regime that had been in power for more than 30 years. This protest, which was later given the term 'Arab Spring', then spread to Libya which resulted in the collapse of the Qaddafi regime and even the death of the President in the terrorist acts of militant groups. Similar protests took place in Syria and Yemen, which later expanded into a battlefield of civil war to the present. In Gulf monarchies, such as Bahrain, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, demonstrations have also taken place but can be tempered by the regime in power. Demonstrations in Middle Eastern countries

during the Arab Spring era basically required political change in each country. Although the effect varies from country to country, in general, the Arab Spring encourages the emergence of Islamic movements that require radical change. In Tunisia, the group emerged Al-Mutabayinun 'ala Al-Maut, Jundu Asad ben Al-Furat. and The word 'Aqabah ben Nafi' (Noon Post, 2014). In Algeria there is Moroccan Al-Qaeda, Harakah At-Tauhid wa Al-Jihad from Mali, and Al-Murabithun (Aljazeera, 2017).

B. METHOD

The emergence of radical Islamic organizations also occurred in Egypt. The moment of overthrow Husni Mubarak may be said to be the moment of the revolution of the Egyptian people because of that At that time the mass protest actions were increasingly demanding the resignation of Mubarak who had been in power for 30 years. Although the regime of violent actions, the wave of people's will could no longer be dammed so that Mubarak stepped down on February 11, 2011. After that there were democratic processes that finally delivered Muhammad Mursi from the Ikhwan Al Muslimin (IM) to the presidency. However, the political dynamics of Egypt then led to demonstrations that wanted Mursi's resignation. These actions were later used by the military to coup Mursi in 2013. This situation triggered various attacks and acts of terror from groups claimed as supporters of Mursi, in the form of bombings and brutal attacks on government offices and government figures. The target of the attack then also extended to several churches. The most recent bombing action was the shooting of worshipers on Friday at Al-Raudhah Mosque in Birel-Abd City, 50 km west of El-Arish City, North Sinai, 24 November 2017. But the claim is also doubtful because firstly, there was no acknowledgment from the party IM and second, many studies report that the attacks originated from two factions, namely terror groups in the North Sinai region, and other non-Sinai terror groups that are in the country (Global Security, 2017). This raises several questions. First, who and from what side are these groups? Second, what are their motivations and goals for carrying out terror attacks in Egypt? Third, why have they increased terror attacks since the ouster of Mursi? Fourth, why do they direct attacks on the government and the church.

This paper intends to examine the narrative of acts of terrorism in Egypt after the resignation of Mursi from his presidency to see the transformation of terrorist groups in the country. The study is described based on the formulations above, and with organizational and instrumental theory as an analysis too

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

A. Terrorism

The definition of terrorism according to Article 6 of Act No. 15 of 2003 concerning Eradication of the Criminal Acts of Terrorism is:

"Anyone who intentionally uses violence or threat of violence creates an atmosphere of terror or fear of people widely or causes mass casualties, by seizing freedom or the loss of life and property of others, or cause damage or destruction to vital strategic objects or the environment or public facilities or international facilities "

The definition of terror itself according to the Big Indonesian Dictionary (KBBI) is "Efforts to create fear, horror, and cruelty by a person or certain group." However, the use of terror does not automatically constitute "terrorism" because "terror" can be carried out for criminal and personal purposes (Salenda, 2009). So that not all acts of violence can be categorized as acts of terrorism. Acts of terrorism carried out in the form of intimidation of coercion systematically and intentionally, and intended for political effects.

Between criminal acts and terrorist acts are distinguished by the reason for the action, the perpetrators, and their victims. Ordinary crime is generally carried out for a specific limited purpose, for example, wanting to rob the victim's money. While the objectives to be achieved by acts of terrorism are long-term and developing. From the perpetrators side, criminal organizations are generally limited in membership; while terrorist organizations are confidential and recruitment of members of those organizations is carried out as much as possible. And finally, in terms of targets, criminal acts have specific targets according to their objectives (such as choosing people who are suspected of having money to be robbed). Conversely, acts of terrorism are often random; the victims are generally people who are not related to the goals of the terrorist organization (Conte, 2010).

In conclusion, terrorism is indeed an act or threat that can disrupt the security of many people, but it is planned, there are political objectives inherent, and are considered illegal by the policy of a country or customary public. From some of the above opinions terrorism can be defined as the use of violence aimed at changing government policy on an issue (or several issues) but the violence is directed at people who are actually not connected to the policy (Ozdamar, 2008: 94).

B. Instrumental Approach and Organizational Approach

Instrumental approaches view that acts of terror are carried out intentionally by political actors. In other words, terrorism is a tool used by the perpetrators to end political stability. This theory contains a reference that acts of terror carried out based on:

1. The calculation of cost and benefit.
2. Not only targeting the object, but also targeting the success of the action.
3. Their actions are rational and decide to take action by collaborating and interacting with other actors.
4. Changes in political constellation is a sign of the success of the action (Ozdamar, 2008: 91-92).

To read the calculations and the rationality of their actions, the authors use an organizational approach. This theory in the study of terrorism implies that terrorism today is based on an organizational system and its main goal is the sustainability of the mission (survival) (Ozdamar, 2008: 93). Form of existence and work system based on organization makes terrorism like a company (firm). All of his work activities are similar to those of a company by calculating the profit and loss and loyalty behind each of its actions. This understanding then provides a reading that the narration in acts of terrorism cannot be separated from:

1. The process of delivering benefits from the leader to its members, to maintain organizational loyalty and integrity. Then the emergence of groups that narrow or switch affiliation to other groups, can be understood based on the imbalance in the process of delivering benefits.
2. The existence of a competition maneuver. This has led to claims from various terror groups for one action.
3. The process of finding members or affiliates. Acts of terror one of which is intended to grab the attention of people who actually have a radical tendency to join the actor's organization.
4. Two-way communication process. An act of terror is also a summons, so that it will be followed by acts of terror from other groups. This is the first line of communication. After that followed a claim that usually includes religious languages. This quote is actually a key word to communicate indirectly with people who have a radical tendency, so that they support, or even imitate, both in the form of organizations and solos (lone wolf terrorist). This is the second communication channel.

Periodization of Terrorism in Egypt

Terrorism in the Egyptian context is divided into several periods, including the period of the Islamism movement. Before World War I, Egypt was part of the Ottoman Caliphate and after the defeat of the Ottomans, Egypt became a royal state even though it was de facto under British control. Egypt's initially religious life, where the ulama dominated much social and political life, was replaced by secular life, accompanied by widening economic inequality. It was during this time (1920s) that movements and thoughts emerged to restore religion to the social and political life of the Egyptian nation, led by two large factions. First, movements led by spiritual and academic leaders; and secondly, a movement driven by the Muslim Brotherhood founded by Hasan Al Banna in 1928. The IM movement was initially aimed at transforming Egypt into a country that implements Islamic law and spreads its ideology through various economic and social activities. But this movement later developed along with the entry of radical thoughts brought by Sayid Qutb (Perliger, 2006). at this time played a role in the Egyptian liberation movement from British occupation, but through actions which in modern terminology are categorized as terrorism. IM activists killed the British and Egyptian officials. One notable action was the assassination of Amin Ottman Peha, a senior Egyptian official, in January 1945 and Mahmud Nokrashi, Prime Minister of Egypt in December 1948. Two months later (February 1949), Al Banna was killed by government agents. At the same time, the IM also sent militant forces against Israel, especially on the Egyptian-Israeli border. This action, in the eyes of most Egyptian Muslims, is a 'jihad' action to help Palestine, while in the eyes of the West, this action is categorized as terrorism.

On July 23, 1953, the Egyptian military staged a coup against King Farouk and Egypt became a republic with Gamal Abdul Nasser as president. In the era of King Farouk and Nasser era, IM activities were faced with an iron fist by the regime. Thousands of IM activists were jailed and this organization was declared banned. 'Auf (2017) divides the periodization of terrorism in Egypt into three sections based on political interests and scope, as follows.

1 The first period (1940-1981)

During this time, the Muslim Brotherhood formed the armed militia of AtTandzim Al-Khash. These militia terror acts were aimed at the government - both personal, agency and property - because of the clash of vision with the IM, where the IM considered the Egyptian government at that time to be un-Islamic. The government faced IM actions by disbanding the organization, as was done by President Nasser and Prime Minister An-Nuqrasyi Basya. In 1981, IM activists killed President Anwar Sadat in 1981 on the grounds that Sadat entered into a peace agreement with Israel that took place in 1978 (BBC, 2017). The IM viewed this agreement as a betrayal of Sadat, whereas Sadat had

previously allied with IM to cripple the power of the Egyptian left (Al-Khatib, 2012). In this period it was seen that the target of the attack was domestic politicians.

2.The second period (1990-2006)

Terrorism in this period has developed in such a way and is different from the first period, seen from several factors:

1. Actors come from different groups, although generally their thinking is rooted in Al Qutb's version of jihadist thought.
2. Entering the 1990s, Egyptian 'alumni' Afghan jihadists returned to Egypt. They became new actors in Egypt, formed many groups, and carried missions and interests that were different from the first period actors.
3. 3. Actors actively launch terror. In addition to killing government leaders, such as Parliamentary Speaker Rafa'at Al-Mahgoub (1990), they are more likely to attack tourism sites, both tourists (many from Israel), and tourism facilities. The target of the attack in 1993 was Luxor, in 2004 was the Hilton Hotel (Taba), and in 2005 was the tourist area of Sharm Al Sheikh.
4. Judging from the target of the attack, it appears that the target is the Egyptian government and tourism industry players / users, who are seen as representing the West in the Middle East and protecting Israel's interests in the region. Thus, it can be concluded that the political interests behind this second period of terrorism are political interests in the global sphere, as they are intended as a reaction to the control of the United States (West) in the Middle East as an Islamic World region.

3.The third period (2011-present)

The bomb blast at the Al Qiddisun church, the Coptic Christian church in Alexandria, is said to be an act of terrorism that started this period. The government, both personal and facilities, was the main target of the attack and detonation at this time. The main actor of this period was the Al Tauhid wa Al Jihad group based in North Sinai Province. These acts of terror have intensified since the military coup against Mursi. In addition to the Al Tauhid wa Al Jihad group, there are also Anshar Bayt Al Maqdis and ISIS militias in Sinai.

This third period of terrorism began with the escalation of the mass movement that demonstrated against Mubarak in 2011, so that the concentration of security and military apparatus was concentrated in the capital and other major cities. As a result, the North Sinai region has become increasingly neglected and has become a strategic area for the gathering of Egyptian terrorist groups that have existed for a long time, such as Al Takfir wa Al Hijra, Jays Al Islam, and Jund Al Islam, as well as new groups

from within the country such as Afnan Misr, and groups from abroad, such as Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis, Kataib Al Furqan, Al Morabitoun, and others. Chaotic conditions in the capital city after the overthrow of Mursi provided opportunities for terror groups to enter the capital. Thus, at that time, the focus of the Egyptian police and military was divided between facing protest actions by Mursi supporters and acts of terror from various groups based in Sinai.

In addition, there are also new terror groups that are not based in Sinai, but around Cairo, such as Al 'Iqab Al Tsauri and Harakah Al Muqawamah Al Sya'biyyah Mishr, commonly referred to as ARPM (Allied Popular Resistance Movement). ARPM declared itself in January 2015, precisely when Egypt remembered the January 25 Revolution. This group has been carrying out more than 130 acts of terror. ARPM was formed after the resignation of Mursi in July 2013. Through their Facebook account which had been blocked for a long time, they stated that the security and police agencies were the targets of their attack. After that, the attack was transferred to international corporate facilities (TIMEP, 2017).

This third series of terror phenomena contains political interests that are dynamic. Attacks on personnel, agencies and military and court facilities, become resistance to the government (domestic). Then the attack on public places, economic centers and international corporations became a symbol of resistance to foreign hegemony in Egypt. Meanwhile, the attack on the church became a symbol of resistance to religious identities other than Islam. Acts of terror that they do with dynamic targets and interests will ultimately lead to one main target, the Egyptian government.

Demographic Aspects of North Sinai as a Base for Terrorist Groups

In general, the Sinai Peninsula is a special region compared to other regions of Egypt. Sinai, along with the Western Desert and the Eastern Desert, is Egypt's main oil producer, alongside the Gulf of Suez. After the 1967 Arab Islamic War, Sinai was taken over by Israel. Then, in 1973, Egypt waged a war to retake the peninsula. In 1978, an Egypt-Israel agreement was signed which agreed that Israel would leave Sinai. Currently Sinai is one of the main tourist destinations in Egypt, thanks in part to its beautiful beaches and the existence of Mt. Sinai which is a center of pilgrimage. North Sinai Province is one of the provinces located in northeastern Egypt which covers the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. The north is bordered by South Sinai Province, the west is bordered by Port Sa'id, Ismailia and Suez provinces, and the east is bordered by the Gaza Strip and Israel. The capital is El-Arish, which is led by a governor who is appointed directly by the President of Egypt.

But now Sinai, especially the northern part of the most populous, is the most sensitive area for Egypt. This region is a source of government decisions in imposing an emergency status on terrorism. Factors that make North Sinai a magnet for terrorist groups are mainly its poor economic conditions, its territory directly bordering Israel, and poor political communication between the Egyptian Government and the Sinai region as a whole. This triggered the Sinai residents' disloyalty towards the government. According to Al-Markaz Al'Arabi (2012) the Sinai disloyalty is very easy to form considering the following are:

1. The North Sinai region was once integrated with Gaza, primarily as a channel for trade and social interaction. This caused the inhabitants of North Sinai to be emotionally closer to Gaza than to Egypt.

The long-standing closeness made North Sinai and Gaza a territory, interacting deeply and creating family ties.

2. Since the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement, the hopes of the Palestinian population in Egypt have been dashed. For them, this peace is tantamount to ending Egypt's defense of Palestine. The attitude of the Palestinian population also influenced the perspective of the people of North Sinai to the Egyptian Government.

3. Strong turmoil in the border regions in countries led by military regimes is common, as has happened in Egypt. The repressive attitude of the Egyptian government of the Husni Mubarak era, then continued in the era of General Al Sisi, has brought down very many civilian casualties in North Sinai and some of those victims have strong ties with the population of Gaza.

4. The Egyptian government is also discriminatory in the bureaucratic and development fields of Sinai, making it difficult for Sinai residents to have large-scale economic resources (Ali, 2013). The economy of North Sinai is supported by illegal trade routes through tunnels connecting the North Sinai region to Gaza, but then the military government destroyed this route.

With the four facts above, disappointment is a major factor for creating chaos in North Sinai. Although geopolitical and economic factors also have a role to do with the emergence of Egyptian security instability, specifically the North Sinai region. The separatist movements that emerged, especially with the potential for the formation of the Islamic State of North Sinai, would undermine the existence of Egypt as a sovereign state. For further discussion, the author will focus more on the terrorist movement in North Sinai in particular Anshar Bayt Al Maqdis (ABM). This organization for the past few years, precisely after the Arab Spring, has become the

most active terror organization in Egypt, especially the Sinai region. The discussion will review aspects of history, genealogy, and ABM recruitment patterns.

The Terrorism Movement of Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis

1. History and Genealogy of Thought of Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis

The Arab Spring storm in Egypt in 2011 inspired a man named Tawfiq Muhammad Freij Ziada, a former member and follower of the Tawhid wal Jihad group. Tawfiq also founded a jihadist organization now known as Ansar Jerusalem, but over time, this organization was better known as Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis (ABM) (TIMEP, 2017). Tawfiq is also known to have been a member of Hamas, then later left disappointed, then settled in Sinai. Then, with the support of the Tawhid wal Jihad group, Tawfiq founded ABM which was officially announced on June 25, 2012. Then a number of small jihadi groups joined in supporting ABM (Moniquet and Lhoussain, 2014). Even though ABM is a jihadis group that is relatively newly formed in Egypt, the traces of Tawfiq's thoughts related to jihad, terror, and the establishment of an Islamic state can be traced long ago. Tawfiq is known to have had contact with extremist organizations that were already established earlier, such as Tawhid wal Jihad, Jama'ah Islamiyyah, Al Qaeda, and so on (Global Security, 2017). Tawfiq's decision to make the Sinai region the basis of his organization was based on the consideration that northern Sinai was a strategic area and far from government control. Sinai Peninsula is a border area which is also one of the strategic areas for trade routes. Both legal and illegal trade (Al-Naggar, 2014). ABM appeared as a form of Tawfiq Muhammad Freij Ziada's disappointment at the Egyptian socio-political authoritarian regime which was considered a failure in resolving the country's economic, social and political problems. Actually ABM can be said to be the successor to the baton of the previous radical movement in Egypt, which since the 1970s has sprung up in Egypt. The movement began with an Islamic political movement that was born after undergoing a long process of intellectual debate, disappointment, and a desire to progress and change.

The Islamic political movement, also known as the Islamist movement, offers a solution to the impasse of the ruling regime in overcoming all the problems of statehood, such as corruption, poverty, and the arbitrariness of the authorities. The solution offered is a return to Islamic values because Egypt is a country with a majority Muslim population and the presence of ulama is very dominant in the community. The collective awareness of the Muslims in Egypt of the condition of their country (which was colonized by the British) became one of the main attractions so that the Islamic political movement immediately received public acceptance. One of the most widespread Islamic awakening

movements in Egypt is the Muslim Brotherhood (IM) which was founded by Hassan Al Banna in 1928. Initially the IM was not a political movement, but a tarbiyah Islamiyyah (Islamic education) movement aimed at providing Islamic teachings for Egyptian society. Over time, the IM transformed into a political movement and initially took the position of a non-extreme Islamic political movement (Bayat, 2013) but after Al Banna's death, some IM groups accepted Sayyid Qutb's more radical ideas in opposition to the government. Meanwhile, the Jama'ah Islamiyyah, which from the very beginning, was aiming politically by establishing an Islamic state system. Jama'ah Islamiyyah was founded in 1970 by Nageh who then developed rapidly when led by Dr. Omar Abdel-Rahman, who is famous for the masterpiece of his book entitled "Mawqif Al-Qur'an 'ala Khusuhumih" which is a reference and legitimacy of every terrorist act carried out by Jama'ah Islamiyyah.

Radical thought with the meaning of wanting to change the government system radically by using violence (Muis, 2012: 11) spread to the activists, and they also spread into various other organizations that emerged later. Tawfiq Muhammad Freij Ziada, founder of ABM, was originally a member of Jama'ah Islamiyyah. His presence in the contestation of Islamic politics can be seen as a response to the failure of the IM in realizing an Islamic system with the style of Sayyid Qutb. ABM can more or less be seen as a product of 'cross-marital' Jama'ah Islamiyyah and IM. In essence, both of them have the same goal of wanting to establish a just and prosperous society based on Islamic values, because as Mohammad Ayoob said, Islam is not just a religion but also a political ideology that is a tool to achieve political goals that are reflected in the use of Islamist symbols and concepts in the public sphere (Gafur, 2014: 6). The Sinai Peninsula which is the basis of ABM's strength is an area with a low economic percentage. Poverty is the most frightening specter for the Sinai population. It was recorded that in 2008-2009 Sinai could only get out of the poverty zone. But in 2010-2011 Sinai experienced an economic downturn in view of the decline in tourism income which was the main source of income for Sinai residents (Al Naggar, 2014). That said, the Sinai experienced a crisis at the time of the Egyptian revolution known as the Arab Spring.

Apart from that, as mentioned earlier, the Sinai Peninsula is an area of Israeli-Egyptian conflict. Israel occupied Sinai then in 1978 Egypt-Israel signed the Camp David agreement to return Sinai territory to Egypt. The Camp David Agreement signed directly by Anwar Sadat (and Israeli PM Menachem Begin) has hurt the hearts of the Egyptian people, especially pro-Palestinian Muslims who hope that Egypt will become an Arab super-power country and side with the Arab-Palestinian nation. Because, with the signing of the agreement means

that Egypt has recognized the existence of Israel as a sovereign state. On October 6, 1981, President Anwar Sadat was shot dead; the Islamic group Tandzim al-Khass (armed militia founded by some IM activists in the 1940s) claimed responsibility (Djamaluddin, 2012). Sadat's death led to political tensions in Egypt, especially between Islamic groups against the regime. Then, Hosni Mubarak took control of the Egyptian government. Initially, Mubarak took IM as a form of government accommodation to the demands of the opposition. The Islamic politics of IM basically emphasizes moderateism and opposes extremism, so they are willing to cooperate with the government. Under the leadership of Al Tilmisani, the IM officially formed a coalition with the government in 1982. The IM was transformed as a new political force in the government and some of its members got a ration in the structural structure of the Egyptian government (Ranko, 2014: 94).

Meanwhile, after the death of President Sadat, terrorism in Egypt developed with the birth of new terrorist groups. The efforts of the Mubarak regime to embrace the IM are actually a strategy to reduce the birth of new terror groups (Ranko, 2014: 97). However, Mubarak's aim was unsuccessful because Sayyid Qutb's extreme ideology had already spread among the groups. Furthermore, as the political position of the IM became stronger, the Mubarak regime turned hostile to the IM and even made arrests of its activists. The January 2011 Egyptian Revolution which toppled Mubarak and was followed by elections, brought IM to the top of the Egyptian government. However, in just one year (2012-2013), Mursi was overthrown in a military coup. Mursi and IM leaders were jailed, and IM protesters protesting the coup were fired on by the authorities. This condition has led to the disappointment and anger of Islamic movement activists and radical groups. ABM was declared on June 25, 2012 and shortly after that, a series of acts of terrorism in Egypt returned. In the midst of a state of political turmoil, ABM came up with an act of terror they had prepared. These acts of terror, among others, were triggered by their disappointment at the ouster of Muhammad Mursi from the presidency (Gold 2014).

2. Pattern of Recruitment of Members of Ansar Bayt Al Maqdis

Since the 2011 Egyptian Revolution against the Mubarak regime, there has been security instability in the Sinai Peninsula. Sinai protests against the government often occur, accompanied by the emergence of extreme group movements that make Sinai as a power base (Gold 2014). After the military coup that toppled Mursi in July 2013, ABM expanded their attack to the nation's capital, Cairo. The bombs were installed in cars targeting the government officials. Tourists who vacation in Sinai which are famous for their tourism are

also the targets of terror operations. Terrorist operations are indeed more focused on foreign elements in Egypt. Because this extremist movement strongly rejects foreign interference in Egypt, as does Hassan al-Banna, founder of IM (Nasution, 2000).

Not only stop there, ABM with capital of 2,000 militant members has managed to attract the attention of large terrorist organizations such as Al Qaeda and ISIS to merge (Moniquet and Lhoussain, 2014). Although relatively new, ABM members are increasingly growing. By targeting members from the local Sinai community, ABM takes advantage of the situation and conditions that occur in Sinai. In general, the Sinai people are very disappointed with the discrimination of the economic policies of the central government. This disappointment is widespread and ingrained, so that for the people of Sinai, the central government is their enemy. Utilizing these situations and conditions, ABM netted them to unite against the government (Burgrova, 2016). When support from the local Sinai community for extreme groups strengthened, the government did not immediately respond. The economy is getting worse without a solution from the government, while extremist groups offer a more 'realistic' solution (Burgrova, 2016). Sinai residents who are members of ABM conduct illegal trade with extremist groups outside Egypt, including the arms and narcotics trade. Thus, the factor of fulfilling the economic needs and the doctrine of jihad against the tyrannical regime and the 'foreign' capitalist, made them confident to join ABM (Al Naggar, 2014). Here we can see that the massive benefits delivered by the ABM maneuver to the people of the North Sinai region, in order to maintain member loyalty. The process of delivering benefits was also seen in the recruitment of Tawfiq's right hand man, including Bedawi Nasif alias Muhammad Ali Afifi and Muhammad alSaid Hassan Ibrahim al-Toukhi, better known by the name of Abu Obayda. Nasif then served as the organization's representative and later on, Abu Obayda changed the direction of the ABM group to become a materially strong organization, both regionally and functionally (TIMEP, 2017).

Bedawi Nasif initially intended to 'wage jihad' in Iraq by inviting one of his friends, Bakri Harun. But they were stranded in Yemen, until they were banned and deported. The 2011 Revolution became a 'struggle' field that led Nasif to support actions against Islamist groups in fighting the Mubarak regime. On one occasion, in the middle of a demonstration in Tahrir Square, Cairo, Nasif met with a person named Ahmad 'Asyusy (leader of Ansar As-Shari'ah for Egypt and North Africa) who encouraged him to establish an armed group by promising donations. Nasif, through Bakri Harun, was later reunited with Tawfiq. Nasif not only received large donations, but the full trust

of Tawfiq. Nasif became Tawfiq's right hand man and the mobilization of the ABM movement in Sinai was entrusted to him.¹ While Abu Obayda (At-Toukhi) was given the trust to mobilize the movement in Cairo (Farghili, 2016). Subsequently, in 2014 ABM was affiliated with ISIS, marked by bai'at (pledge of allegiance) and changed its name to Wilayat Sinai. This Bai'at process produces the product of an Islamic state in the Sinai region. This decision was taken because ABM's position was difficult to move due to the dominance of other stronger organizations in the region, such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS. In addition, there are more pressing factors, namely the number of senior ABM leaders who were killed by the Egyptian government in the period March-October 2014 (Gartenstein-Ros, 2015). This Egyptian government attack is an attempt to retaliate for acts of terror committed by ABM.

The Sinai region or Ansar Al Dawla Al Islamiyyah fi Bayt Al Maqdis (Islamic State Partisans Group Bayt al-Maqdis) also consists of ex-activist Ikhwan Al Muslimin (IM). Even though IM has officially stated that there is no connection with ABM, many ex-IMs have finally joined ABM as a form of their disappointment over the overthrow of Mursi in 2012 and the desire for revenge. Then the terror movement launched by the ABM group and other extreme groups is known as the Revolutionary Punition movement (TIMEP, 2017) The joining of ex-IM members to ABM was very beneficial for both of them. Ex-IM members can shed deep disappointment in the new government regime by carrying out radicalization or acts of terror. Meanwhile, the recruitment of ex-IM members is also a plus point for ABM, because it can attract more public attention. Moreover, with the competition between terror groups, the increasing number of member recruitment makes ABM more superior among other extreme groups in Egypt.

The acts of terror carried out by ABM also had an influence in this recruitment effort. For example, the assassination attempt of the Egyptian Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim on 5 September 2013 and the bombing of the natural gas pipeline on 5 February 2011 and 17 January 2014 (TIMEP, 2017) as a form of protest on the Egyptian economy, is one of ABM's strategies in organizing views public about the politics and economics of a bad government regime. These actions, coupled with religious narratives (for example 'jihad' or sharia enforcement) can be seen as a form of promotion of ABM as a new terrorist group that is useful to attract public attention so as to facilitate the recruitment of new members.

D. CONCLUSION

The Arab Spring is indeed a big storm in Egypt. It not only caused political upheaval and economic crisis, but also increased acts of terrorism from extreme Islamic groups. The strong relationship between the Arab Spring political revolution in Egypt and the increase in acts of terrorism not only met at the point that terrorism had existed in the dark side of the course of the history of modern Egyptian politics, but also that there were open opportunities due to high political friction between civilians and the regime.

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