Claiming appearances in Jacques Rancière’s work

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Abstract

The present article aims to analyze the notion of appearance in Jacques Rancière’s philosophical work, with a view to delineating a digressive line of a long tradition that insists on affirming the power of thought and truth against the inconsistency of appearances. In this sense, an attempt is made to argue the potential that appearances have in the construction of new imaginaries and in the creation of other forms of common sense.

Keyword: J. Rancière, appearance, scene, spectacle, surface, creation.

A. INTRODUCTION

The philosophical work of Jacques Rancière seeks to distance himself from a broad tradition of thought that is based on a crisis of confidence in appearances, from that extensive theoretical landscape that places appearances in a kind of radical otherness against which thought has built its power of truth. At least since Plato there is a certain vintage air that seems to be unable to stop updating. That suggestive image of a cave where men were chained together in the company of shadows that they took for real does not differ too much in its structure from that followed by the tradition of Moses and that, in more contemporary terms, is modulated as a critique of society of the Show. Criticism in current terms not only affects the power that appearances have, in their capacity to inhibit reflection and true knowledge, in reducing it to an immediate, emotional or fleeting experience, but above all in the belief that they are powerfully manipulable elements within a dominant simulation and mass mediation technologies. The question that manifests itself in various forms is how to escape the seductions and inconsistencies of appearances, how to cross these surfaces to access the truth they cover.

We could say that it is a double suspicion: on the one hand, the suspicion of appearances as appearances, the sensible world that they generate; on the other, its fallacious character, for not being able to coincide with the true, as a kind of subjective illusion that cannot avoid being a distortion of the truth. Contrary to the eternal truths that were sought to discover through reason, the world of appearances is presented as contingent, arbitrary and potentially dangerous for those who seek the truth, but this suspicion insists on affirming, at the same time, that power From thought it seems that it cannot be freed if it is not by opposing the power and magic
of appearances. In this context, Rancière proposes to ask again what the role of
appearances is, when the set-ups of appearing are no longer modulated by
representation.

In this sense, this article aims at the postulates made by the French
philosopher Jacques Rancière around this notion, in order to rethink the putting into
shape of appearance when the metric that regulates it is no longer representation. If
you like, to a large extent, the restlessness that underlies this article is oriented by the
disturbing question that Rancière opens when he says “the “loss of the real” is in fact
a loss of appearance” (Rancière, 1996, 132), in arguing what this enigmatic sentence
could mean.

In our understanding, Rancière’s articulations contribute to outlining another
theoretical landscape for thought that, on the one hand, questions the ‘scenic
detachment’ (Malabou, 2011) of contemporary philosophy; and, on the other, it
expresses the interest in thinking about another destiny in a way that is not the
ethical necessity that privileges the formless, the unthinkable, the de-figuration.
Where the critique of form ceases to be a dominant form of ideology.

Thus, this article is an attempt to elaborate a fabric that allows us to think
about determinations of appearing that are not determinations of images as objects
installed before a subject or determinations of a form that imposes itself on a passive
matter, but rather to create a fragile architecture where the poetic word and the
plastic form can carry out their exchanges. In the first part we contextualize the
theoretical displacement that Rancière proposes in our analysis of appearances, in
this case situated in the critique of the critique of the society of the spectacle1; a
second part aimed at developing what place do appearances have in Rancière's
thought; and, a last one, which analyzes the implications of this understanding of
appearances for thought and action, while proposing other assumptions from which
to critically assess them.

B. LITERATUR REVIEW

In the article “The theater of images” (Rancière, 2008), published in the
catalog of Alfredo Jaar's exhibition La politique des images, under the direction of
Nicole Schweizer, which took place at the Musée cantonal des Beaux-Arts2,
Lausanne (2007), Rancière affirms that there is a generalized rumor that places
images between drowning and anesthesia: too many images drown us with their
sensitive power and others anesthetize us with their indifferent parade. Hence, the
demand of artists committed to the so-called ‘political art’ is that they should teach
us to read images, to discover the “[...] game of the machine that produces them and
hides behind it” (Rancière, 2008, 69). In Rancière's opinion, this way of presenting
the disease of images and its antidote has been widely accepted. However, he
maintains “[...] it is not true that those who dominate the world deceive us or blind us by showing us too much images. Their power is exercised above all by discarding them” (Rancière, 2008, 71). For this reason, for him, the artist’s work does not consist in ‘suppressing the excess of images’, but rather consists in ‘staging their absence’, but not as an impossibility of presentation, but rather to give rise to certain images that he selects. The interested party strives to hide. Excess seems to be a defect to be remedied and that is not where the strategy should be directed. For Rancière ‘[...] the political artist’s strategy does not consist in reducing the number of images, but in opposing them with another mode of reduction, another way of seeing that is taken into account” (Rancière, 2008, 72).

The criticism of the excess of images does not begin for Rancière with Mythologies by Roland Barthes or with Guy Debord’s The Society of the Spectacle, but the form we know of this analysis refers to the end of the 19th century with the creation of the ‘polypero of images’. Rancière says that “[...] it was necessary to separate the democratic number, it was necessary to give another form to the old opposition between two nervous systems, between two organizations of the sensible multiplicity of messages” (Rancière, 2008, 73). In the dominant system, informing means, first of all, ordering the staging, putting in shape, eliminating any singularity from the images, reducing them to a strictly deictic function. That is why he will say “[...] there is no torrent of images, there is a staging of the relationship between the authority of the authorized word and the visible that it selects for us: that of events that matter to the extent that those to whom they happen matter matter” (Rancière, 2008, 75). Rather, the problem is that we see ‘too many bodies without names’, too many bodies ‘that do not return the gaze we are giving them’. By Therefore, his approach moves away from all hermeneutics that tend to identify the problem with the excess of images, as well as all those that tend to assign a stable meaning.

 Probably the sharpest criticism made in recent years of the dangers of appearances is that made by Guy Debord in The Society of the Spectacle, where he analyzes various aspects of the structural changes that have occurred under the domination of modern production conditions. The thesis that he supports and that articulates his argument is that life has become a spectacle, where spectacle means a concrete inversion of life, in which human beings are spectators and parts of a movement of which we have no agency. In Debord’s opinion, the spectacle appears as if it were society itself, but it is only the place of the deceived gaze and false consciousness.

 Debord, in the fourth thesis of The society of the spectacle, argues that “the spectacle is not a set of images, but a social relationship between people mediated by images” (Debord, 1999, 25). It is a vision of the world that has been objectified. Thus the spectacle constitutes the present model of socially dominant life. If the first phase of domination of the economy had implied an obvious degradation of being in having, the present phase would be that of a total occupation of social life in which
the accumulated results of the economy would have led to a generalized slide from having to having to seem (Debord, 1999, 28). Life put completely at the service of capital, where not even the increase in leisure could be considered as a liberation from work, nor from the world made up of that work, but as another activity lost in the submission of its result (Debord, 1999, 33). This spectacularization would have originated in the loss of unity of the world and of existence, as a result of the generalized separation of the worker from his product, which would have led him to lose all unitary point of view. The spectacle would then be the language of this split that through its simulacrum brought together the separate, but as separate, distance men from each other and uniting them more intimately with their global product, “(...) the more it contemplates the less lives; the more he accepts to recognize himself in the dominant images of need, the less he understands his own existence and his own desire. The exteriority of the show with respect to the active man is manifested in that his own gestures are no longer his, but that of another who represents him ”(Debord, 1999, 33).

Debord insists, from various perspectives, on the totalitarian management that merchandise makes of the conditions of existence, occupying life and expropriating it from the bonds that once constituted it. Through a process of abstraction of the subjects from their experiences, the creation of false needs for increased subsistence, the subject of a real consumer becomes a consumer of illusions. In fact, he will propose the figure of the star as a spectacular representation of living man, insofar as his condition is that of pure appearance. This star would create an illusory community of reified men, submissive to the cumulative power of an independent artificial, which is nothing more than an agglomeration of solitudes without illusion (Debord, 1999, 52). Masking, under this false unity, the class division on which the true unity of the capitalist mode of production rests, hiding its profound split in the images of the spectacle, which are nothing but the expression par excellence of capital.

In Debord’s opinion, the political struggle has remained abstract (Debord, 1999, 65) and when it has tried to establish concrete political and economic struggles it has ceased to be critical. Therefore, it has not transformed the world; at best, it has politically transformed perception. So the social organization has been built from this fundamental contradiction. When György Lukács showed in 1923 the necessary mediation between theory and practice, in which the proletarians cease to be "spectators" of events to choose them and live them in a conscious way, he described as effective merits of the Bolshevik party everything that the party Bolshevik was not (Debord, 1999, 79). For Debord, the revolutionary orientation cannot but contemplate a critique of the totality of society, a critique that does not agree with any form of power and that is pronounced on all aspects of alienated social life and must learn that it cannot combat alienation under alienated forms.
The emergence of the productive forces requires other relations of production and life practices. In this sense, what Situationism proposes is an appropriation of the elements with which art has operated. For Debord, art has been the common language of social inaction, its suppression and realization are inseparable aspects. Therefore, the proposed appropriation is by way of negation of the negation of the bourgeois conception of art and genius, through the reconversion of its pre-existing elements or sequences, altering the meaning of these fragments, through their recombination, with the object to produce new meanings. It would not be a negation of style or its forms, but a style of negation.

Debord argues that it is not possible to understand the full depth of an image society. It is not even glimpsed that men do not live, they act. They do not have the experience of events for themselves. To effectively destroy the society of the spectacle, men are needed to put into action a practical force.

Jacques Rancière, gives fundamental importance to images to think about the conditions of social transformation, in El Espectador Emancipado as well as in El Des-tino de las images, he wonders, what are the assumptions that have led to declare the images unfit to criticize reality. In “La imagen intolerable” (Rancière, 2010, 89), this analysis leads him to position himself against that intellectual climate that does not stop affirming the powerlessness of thought, which has led to the affirmation of the unrepresentable, as well as to position himself in relation to the various uses that consecrated political artists have made of images in their way of understanding art, they denounce, as in the reflections on the impossible presentation of the Jewish Holocaust. Therefore, it marks a distance with those who, in its understanding, have made inflationary use of what the unrepresentable means, since even when they seem to disagree with the representative tradition, they continue to operate with the same principles and criteria. So, his proposal will be to return to the rupture of the representation regime, to re-examine what we name when we speak of representation and what we try to refer to when we say that certain events are unrepresentable or incommensurable.

Before the question, what exactly is said when it is stated that certain events or situations are unrepresentable by the means of art? Rancière argues that there are two statements that support this question: a first sense has to do with the impossibility of finding a representative tailored to the essential character of what is wanted to represent, that is, that a sensible representation adequate to the idea cannot be found; a second sense is that art cannot escape its simulacrum character. Due to the properties of its media, artistic presentation is characterized by an excess of presence, which betrays the singularity of the event and, by a defect, that is, it operates through a correlate of unreality that subtracts the weight of existence from what it represents. generates effects incompatible with the gravity of the experience. Therefore, this oscillation between ‘excess of presence’ and ‘subtraction from existence’ makes art inappropriate for dealing with certain matters. A problem that
Plato would have solved by opposing to the increased presence and the diminished existence the simple story without artifice and free from all play.

It is this same gesture that for Rancière is reiterated today in the valorization of the witness’s word in its two forms: both the one that values the word that does not make art, but only translates the experience of an individual; like the one who sees a new mode of art in the witness’s account. That is, by establishing a configuration of thought that revokes the representation in favor of the Platonic story or of that new sublime art that is located at the eaves of Burke and Kant.

How then to free the ability to appear from that regulation regulated by the representative regime. Rancière proposes to stop understanding appearances as mirage and begin to understand appearance as disparity, a creative dissymmetry that is always litigious. Dissent means an organization of the sensible in which there is neither reality hidden under appearances, nor a single regime of presentation and interpretation of the given that imposes its evidence on all. Every situation is susceptible to being split from the inside, reconfigured under another regime of perception and significance (Rancière, 2010, 51).

This affirmation of the capacity of appearances requires a counter narrative of the separation between reality and appearances. In this sense, Rancière returns to Debord to propose a different reading from the one that tradition has established. He will say, What is, indeed, the essence of the show according to Guy Debord? It is exteriority. The spectacle is the realm of vision and vision is exteriority, that is, dispossessing of itself. The disease of the spectator man can be summarized in a brief statement: “the more he contemplates, the less he is (Rancière, 2010, 13).

Rancière will affirm that the contemplation that Debord denounces is the contemplation of appearances separated from their truth. From there one could interpret that Debord’s critique in the strict sense is not so much a critique of appearances or spectacles but of disengagement, a critique of separation, of the activity that has been withdrawn from individuals by the machines of capitalist production, “Separation is the alpha and omega of the spectacle” (Debord, 2009, 13). Her criticism is then directed to images as organizers of a collective world whose reality is dispossessing.

Rancière thus opens a certain scene of indeterminacy, in the usual understanding of Debord’s thought, to delve into the capacity of a work with images to move a dominant regime. In fact, it is precisely what, in his opinion, Debord does in his film "The society of the spectacle", where instead of presenting a meeting of capitalists4, shelves full of merchandise or relationships mediated by images, what we see is a of those images, when the voiceover is referring to that complaint, it is a police charge. Rancière stops at this detour that Debord introduces with this image, an image that would make it possible for this distribution of the sensitive that he
calls show to shift. An inversion of the function of images, with which he stages a historical liberation movement. Rancière pauses on a second image, that of Errol Flynn in a Hollywood Raoul Walsh film in which he represents General Custer. Errol Flynn goes with his saber, to the assault. Rancière will say that this image is not set as an emblem of what capitalism hides behind appearances, but rather of the power of that image that must be appropriated. In this way, Rancière problematizes how Guy Debord, who has been set as one of the quintessential referents of the critique of the spectacular, does not renounce spectacles, images, or appearances, but rather explores through misrepresentation how unleash your frozen potency in emptying your uniqueness.

However, while tracing this divergent reading of Debord, Rancière affirms, that the power that Debord highlights in these images is the power of action. Therefore, on the one hand, Rancière undoes a certain stereotype in Debord’s interpretation, but he problematizes a logic, if you will, much more covert, namely the logic of action, which is for him the heart of the representative regime.

Any project that commits itself to affirming a capacity of appearances cannot but question that regime of action that has been the foundation of the representative regime and that has marked a specific way of making political art. With the rupture of the straight line supposed by the representative model between the action and its consequences. Affirming the ability to appear also has to do with revolting the ways in which this logic is articulated.

Of course, Rancière is not unaware that there is a type of mirror image and articulation that works according to what the public expects and that operate from a register of seduction and trivialization, those commonly known as’advertising images’. Rancière calls this type of images ‘images that anticipate their effects’ (Rancière, 2011a, 57). But not all images are reduced to this type of operation, nor does the fact that they are susceptible to this use does not imply a nullification of their potential. There is another type of images that he calls ‘images of art’ –or l’écart– that are opposed to ‘images that anticipate their effects’, that interrupt the media flow, creating a re-agency of circulating images, making a Disruptive community power, an ability to add names and characters, that multiply reality. It is about creating appearances as an exercise in depriving reality of presenting itself as univocal.

Reevaluating Guy Debord’s analysis, Rancière considers that “[…] we do not live in a spectacle society where reality would be lost, but rather in a poster society where appearance ends up being dismissed” (Rancière, 2011a, 57). Although Rancière agrees that merchandise works by confusing reality and appearance, he does not agree with the interpretation that Debord’s analysis makes of this operation. For Rancière, Debord perpetuates the Platonic vision that opposes the passivity of the spectacle and the illusion of seeming to being. In his opinion, the real
does not dissolve in appearance, but rather rejects appearance, thus presenting itself as the only way of being and giving of things, of 'being-together' or of 'being-in-common.

In this way, Rancière, although he introduces a displacement in the reading that is made of Debord in relation to appearances, also distances himself from his position, in particular, on the separation that he establishes between appearance and reality, that sentence that later radicalized Giorgio Agamben by stating that in the spectacular society all possibility of political resistance dissolves, the spectacular society "nullifies and empty any real identity of content and replaces the people and the general will, by the public and its opinion" (Agamben, 2001, 71). Thus, an absolute logic of domination is affirmed, as if politics were not always carried out in the order of appearances. Appearances are never completely detached from reality. It is not that there is no differentiation, of course there is a distance where their exchanges are woven, but it is never a question of completely opposite terms.

It seems to Rancière that if the procedure of criticism consists of something, it is not so much in delving into establishing that distance, but in analyzing that interval, what operations it commits, what relationships it establishes, its links, effects and affects, the visibility that it implies the union between producing and destroying. The dialectic taken from Marx or Brecht remains narrow, that dialectic that consists in revealing, behind the visible appearance, the power of the totality made of contradictions. This dialectic, Rancière will say, as already formulated by Adorno and Horkheimer (2007), finds its limit, since the Enlightenment, based on the connection of phenomena, participates itself in the destructive operation. In Rancière's opinion, appearances take this contradictory relationship between rigor and dialectical irresolution to the extreme. Or put another way: the problem of how not to become an 'absolute matrix' and how not to fall into the risk of contributing to what she denounces.

C. METHOD

The problem of the scene and the ways of appearing run throughout Rancière's work (Rancière, 2002). His notion of appearance is not part of the philosophical constellation of phenomenology, situationism, structuralism, critical sociology, and visual studies. His reflections are rather part of a materialistic tradition. From his earliest research, in his work on worker emancipation, he made it clear that the "[...] primordial demand raised by the workers and the poor was precisely the demand for visibility, a willingness to enter the political sphere of appearance, the affirmation of a capacity to appear" (Rancière, 2003).
The notion of appearance in Rancière is then inserted in a shift from his habitual understanding, where the great turning point is found in the fact that appearance is not something that is opposed to the real, nor to the true, but it is part of its constitution. It is an instant of disparity, of asymmetry, of litigation, an interval that allows another relationship. The "interval of appearance" (Rancière, 1996, 142) is not only the way in which new peoples emerge but also what modulates and defines the articulation of their modes of presentation. How could this ‘way of appearing’ of anybody exist? How could those who do not count, the ‘without-part’, enter the scene? How would an appearing that would make an event present itself? This ability to appear is the practice of an 'as if', it is the affirmation of a capacity that belongs to all of us. It is, in a way, the introduction of a presumed existence. The possibility of introducing an interruption in the distribution of the sensible.

Why is it so important for Rancière that appearance does not end up being dismissed, what is the place that appearances have for him and from what assumptions is this kind of vindication of the ability to appear justified. This power of the edge of appearance as the overflow of one's own. Rancière points out, [...] I insist on the fact that the power of the people is not simply the power of the people who go down to the streets with weapons, but in reality it is the restructuring of a sensitive and visible universe, where it that is not thinkable becomes thinkable, because the order of the visible, consequently, the idea of how the visible can be transformed, changes completely (Rancière, 2019, 46).

The demand for visibility that he makes is much more complex than an interpretation of appearance as that which emerges to 'be seen'. For Rancière the modes of appearance and presentation respond to historical determinations, his proposal is to understand what appears not only as the visible or the invisible but as the device in which that is captured, the way in which these are regulated.

Therefore, the appearance device (Rancière, 1996, 130) is not about a mesh where appearance masks the real, but rather a landscape that introduces a fracture while introducing a composition. A question that, although it maintains some dialogue with concerns such as the spectrology of Jacques Derrida (1995), the immaterials of Jean François Lyotard (1985) and the phantasmagoria of Walter Benjamin (2005), does not properly have to do with this status of appearance. It is not about the incommensurability or the status of the unrepresentable; but how an excess is introduced that cannot be assimilated as meaning.

For Rancière, emancipation, rather than a practice related to a change in consciousness, is the implementation of a dissent - separating from the assignment of an order. For him what opens an event is not found in stupefaction but in the process of an alteration. Hence, appearances adopt this central character in his
emancipatory proposal, because they are capable of altering a space-time frame and installing another scene of appearance, modifying a regime of sensitivity, introducing new forms of experience, of materially opening another time (Rancière, 2006a, 511). Rancière argues, The proletarian as a subject who disposes himself to a political capacity is one who subjectes the time he does not have, who gives himself the ability to play with words and produce appearances that his name itself prohibits (...) pretend it’s not that his name says, as if he had the time, the word and the appearance, neither more nor less than those who deny him those things (Rancière, 2006a, 511).

The question of how lines are drawn, words are arranged and surfaces are distributed is not indifferent, because in these ways of doing, distributions of common space are also designed. The ways in which words or forms are assembled define symbolic and material configurations that cross their own borders. That is why Rancière insists on stopping in the interval of appearing and disappearing, in that initial fold that does not refer to an origin but is a fold that makes things a world (Rancière, 2015). It is about destabilizing the antithetical pairs that promote the self-sufficiency of appearance, inhabiting this between where subjectivities and images are forged, the spacing that cannot be reduced to a middle (l’être-ensemble’) (Rancière, 2006c, 187 ) and the power of multiple division (la puissance du multiplediviseur) (Rancière, 2006c, 67) that work at the same time.

The practice of ‘as if’ (Rancière, 1996, 116) can be interpreted as the fictitious institution of a scene where what did not exist before reaches intelligibility in the space of a non-existent community. It is from this praxis of the ‘as if’ that constitute the forms of appearing of a subject and the opening of a new partage –as division, distribution and, at the same time, witness to the common–, a new aesthetic community whose possibility are immanent to its realization. Doing ‘as if’ is above all about seizing a capacity that deforms established appearances as common. This introduction of a presumed existence or what Rancière in On the edges of the political (Rancière, 2006c) calls ‘suspensive existence’ will be the work of fiction. Fiction as defined in Aisthesis. Scenes from the aesthetic regime of art (Rancière, 2013a, 119), such as the regulated display of appearances and appearances.

 Appearing for Rancière has the need for a production. The damage9 produced by a certain distribution and which is intended to be made visible cannot appear as is, but must be elaborated. Articulating this damage is at the same time, in a certain sense, producing a world, which does not mean that it is the production of an identification, but rather of a delocalization, a disturbance. “Those without a party do not access an already existing public scene: the place on which they will appear must themselves make it emerge” (Déotte, 2012, 105). The conflict is exposed
by creating the scene of that exhibition. Therefore, it is also an alteration, an interruption in the order of culture understood as “formation through imagination” (Déotte, 2012, 106).

It is about a specific relationship that requires building the field of effectiveness of what is supposed in the ‘appearance scene’. It must build the field of effectiveness of that ‘as if’, which we mentioned earlier. As Rancière will say "[...] its differential existence is subject to forms of verification that are always alterations, processes of loss of a certain self: processes of disidentification, expropriation or undifferentiation" (Rancière, 2006b). So it is an appearance that goes through a work of rearrangement and transformation, under the modality of a floating presupposition, at the same time as it is an effective configuration.

The work that consists, on the one hand, in displaying the materiality of appearances against an established order; but, on the other, releasing a specific type of regularity. Hence, the 'phrase-image' is the capital notion that authorizes the conjunction of the principle of rupture, of distance and possibility of continuity, of an oriented articulation without a definitive destination (Rancière, 2011b, 56), the possibility of a disidentification and a form of symbolization of the common as the need to build a space of equivalences (Rancière, 2014, 168).

The scene would be the space in which the place of action is depicted10, the operations that take place in the sphere of the sensible. What it is about, Rancière will say, is to [...] repress the questions of origin, not to think about the origin of thought, knowledge, politics, but to define scenes from which one sees that things are distributed, with the idea that the origin is itself always a kind of scene (Rancière, 2014, 87).

The scene is not so much a place in itself, but the practice of a method that would consist in choosing a singularity, and that singularity is what would indicate to us how we can treat it, creating in that treatment the very conditions of its possibility. That is why when Rancière argues that appearances are the introduction of a scene that has no space within the existing regime, what he proposes is the fragile architecture from which a difference is introduced into a situation that, at the same time creates a dissent and it opens up that experience, creates in turn a certain reunion, a transversal homogeneity. A scene is always an encounter that keeps something unfulfilled, unfinished, but, at the same time, it is the opening to an effective space of the unfulfilled of that encounter. That the meeting is unsuccessful and unsuccessful, at the same time, is what allows us to have a relationship with the event.
A scene marks the emergence of dissent in consensus, of the formless in its form, of the unthinkable of the thinkable, but this scenographic matrix is a matrix that due to the very configuration of its space does not exclude the word or intelligibility. It admits the speech, the representation, the image, the visible and that which does not acquire visibility. Different powers are mixed, there are intensities or moments, different gradations between the argued word and a noisy voice. The word, the name, the place of enunciation build a story, but the scene also contains a series of other elements that remain unnamed.

In our understanding, Rancière proposes a scenographic matrix of thought - understood as action as well. With this, he not only affects the very architecture of the order of discourse, assuming the impropriety of thought and the language that structures it, but also places at the center of his reflections the impossible intertwining of detachment between the visible and the speakable. His notion of appearance, figure, image and visibility has its own history of displacement, marked by relationships of complicity and conflict. We would say that his project is to work on the architecture of the tension between word and image, between figure and disfigurement, between appearance and disappearance, between the various modalities that this écart adopts. Hence, it seems to us that notions such as figurability (Lyotard, 2014), plasticity (Malabou, 2011), materiality (Althusser, 2002), can be put into dialogue with the theoretical tools that Rancière offers us in order to outline This misty sketch from which we understand can open up another possibility for reflections on appearances.

It is possible that the excess of visibility of our time does not leave room for the uncountable, the unrepresentable, the inapparent. Rancière’s work is a persistent effort to rescue appearances, leftovers, the insignificant, worker files, minimal and intermittent gestures. You can try to eliminate appearances, but you can also “continue thinking with ghosts” (Rancière, 2006c, 58). How to keep thinking with specters? Thinking with spectra means thinking in a zone of indetermination between disappearance and substitution, that liminal zone that is the distribution of the sensible. Appearances that are like the evanescent lines that Rancière describes in Mallarmé. The politics of the mermaid (Rancière, 2015).

D. CONCLUSION

Rancière’s shaping of appearances requires another framework from which to assess their functioning, other than on that kind of double bottom from which a certain tradition has inscribed them. This reestablishment of appearances cannot be such if it does not construct another way of understanding the surface, one that is
not subject to the dichotomies of representation. It is about a re-categorization of the surface, understood no longer as a layer that is opposed to a depth or the veil that must be detached in order to know the real or the true. It does not mean that appearance undermines reality, but it does not mean that only the reality that appearances create matters, but rather that it is a work on the tension from which they are constructed.

Rancière’s analysis distances itself from those theoretical postulates that do not cease to insist on the anemia of matter and the corresponding dematerialization that the current paradigm entails. We could even say that it distances itself from diagnoses such as that of Vilém Flusser (2008), according to which the escalation of abstraction would be such that there would no longer be bodies but only surfaces. It is not, therefore, a defense of entities without corporeality.

Rancière’s work is directed more towards understanding the surface as a means of formation or, as he calls it in The Fate of Images, a surface of conversion. Although he does not develop this notion, we think that, based on other articulations that he makes – mainly on the cinema –, it is possible to maintain that a formation surface is such insofar as it welcomes a singularity and allows that singularity to communicate disparate orders of magnitude –asymmetries– without previous relationship. A conversion surface emerges in a performative way, that is, in its very realization, as a relational realization. Therefore, it is a transformation that requires a certain stable state, which does not imply that it is rigid, but that the conversion of operations modifies the structure and, at the same time, any change in the structure modifies the relationship. The surface would be the texture of the interval in the process, that instant of disparity that modulates encounters and allows the reconfiguration of a world. Where reconfiguration does not mean redistribution in the traditional sense, but configuration of sensitive intensities that are controversial (Rancière, 2009, 66), which keep open the double scene of litigation.

Therefore, it is a matter of recognizing action and appearances as intrinsically significant. Capable of producing dissent in their relationship with the rest. Appearance that is not subject only to a similarity, but cannot be without touching that double edge of a similarity and a dissimilarity, of a difference with itself.

For Rancière, that the aesthetic and the political have their moles or objects does not mean that the formation is from an abstract scheme, but from pre-existing material relations. Nor does it attempt to eliminate or discard the old systems entirely or to condemn them as invalid systems, but rather to harness their potentialities and update its senses. For this reason, in this criticism of the form that Rancière carries out, it is not a question of the absence of a relationship between matter and form; it exists, but not as an imposition of active thought on passive
matter. For him, what disappears in the regime change - from the representative regime to the aesthetic regime - is the union present in Aristotle, and recurrent in various debates, of an inert matter that needs a principle alien to it to organize and acquire form. The point is to explore other form acquisition operations. We would say that its displacement has more to do with conceiving matter and form according to an asymmetric relationship in which the relationship plays an active and predominant role; Informed subjects and materialized forms enter into a relationship that results in the creation of new configurations.

For Rancière to consider in an abstract way, on the one hand, a passive, inert and formless matter and, on the other, a form devoid of matter, does not allow us to capture the operation that a configuration allows. Because a formation does not consist of a mere imposition of a form on a matter as if they existed by themselves in isolation.

In this sense, understanding the surface as a conversion surface is what it does is to substitute the passive, indeterminate and formless nature of matter - typical of the representational regime - by the consideration of material conditions that have implicit forms. It is not, then, a question of eliminating the relationship between matter and form, nor of eliminating representation as an operation, but rather of distancing ourselves from an understanding of matter as an inert matter that needs a form to organize it. This does not imply that matter is enough to make new configurations, but rather that it is one of the many elements of multiple heterogeneous orders that in their set of relationships reach a certain resonance until they configure other senses of the possible. Something similar happens with the form, it is not an abstraction to which the matter must conform, but rather a certain topology. The form has a certain consistency, otherwise it could not establish relations with the so-called material world. Matter and form in Rancière are not prior to their relationship. Hence the construction of a common surface - which before we have called scene - it is the place where the powers settled in their own thickness are expressed. Place of coalescence, of surfaces that are in contact and that mutually influence each other so as not to merge, nor to be able to stop transforming. Thickness that requires that ‘matter’ and ‘form’ be reconsidered, from their power to deform, to disfigure to the extent that they appear and form, to give rise to new figurations not foreseen before their occurrence.

In Aisthesis he recovers this shared concern of Mallarmé about formulating a new aesthetic based on three notions: figure, place and fiction. The figure is the power that isolates a site and builds it as a place suitable to withstand appearances, their metamorphoses and vanishing. Fiction is the regulated display of these appearances. What is here is named as a site, we would call it a surface, that fold in
which a world of relationships can be configured that is sculpted with its brilliance and shadow.

The problem that persists in Rancière is how to construct other realities, other forms of common sense, other spatio-temporal arrangements, other communities of words and things, of forms and meanings (Rancière, 2010, 78). Hence, he delves into these bastard notions of tradition, these remains, mists, rationalities that never reached such status, to establish new relationships between words and visible forms, a here and a there, a then and a now (Rancière, 2010, 104). Just as in the analysis of Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe (2002), poetry had to become mythology to resist abstraction, to create its own forms of sensitive consciousness; for Rancière, fiction does not consist in the fabrication of characters, but in the arrangement of means that institute a scene.

An architecture that allows a certain appearance that is not regulated by the yoke of representation, a surface that does not erase the porosity of appearances, that does not submit to the tyranny of transparency as if it were something to be transferred, but rather that learns to bear their specters.

REFERENCES
22. Rancière, J. (2006c), Política, policía, democracia, Santiago de Chile: LOM.