Normalization Factors of Jordan's Diplomatic Relationship with Qatar: Dynamics Analysis of Area Security and National Identity

Abdullah Hamidi
Foundation of King Hussein Amman, Jordan
Email: a.hamidi.99@yahoo.com

Abstract

Jordan as a country that is flanked by several countries in conflict and does not have a wealth of natural resources, making alliances very important for the survival of the country. In meeting these needs, Jordan often allies with hegemonic actors for protective status as well as financial assistance. So in the scope of the Middle East, Jordan chose an alliance with the country of Saudi Arabia and its coalition in the Gulf region in the Gulf Cooperation Council. This alliance was continued until the 2017 Qatar diplomatic crisis, Jordan was forced to cut ties with Qatar so that the alliance with the Saudi kingdom would not be damaged. However, in 2019, Jordan normalized diplomatic relations with Qatar after their two-year stretch. This decision also came even though Saudi Arabia and its coalition had not normalized with Qatar itself, and could potentially jeopardize Jordan's existence if it did so because it was against the Saudi coalition. So the researcher tries to analyze this phenomenon using regional security theory and the level of national identity analysis. Researchers later found that the motive behind the decision was Qatar's support for the protective status of Jordan's Jerusalem.

Keywords: Normalization of Diplomatic Relations; Area Security; National Identity.

A. INTRODUCTION

In contrast to neighboring countries in the Middle East region, Jordan often does not get a big spotlight, this is because they are the only country that did not experience the Arab Spring in 2011 and remain politically stabilized. Additionally, Jordan is flanked by various countries in conflict such as Iraq, Israel, and Syria, and are not rich in natural resources, be it oil, like most countries in the Middle East or water. In the dynamics of the region itself, Jordan has never experienced serious conflicts with other countries. He even became one of the two countries that dared to sign a peace agreement with Israel. He is also one of the pioneering members of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation and Arab League (Mediterranean Affairs, 2014). As a result of this position, the political constellation

The surrounding countries are crucial for the survival of Jordan. So on June 5, 2017, when Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates (hereinafter the UAE), Egypt, and Saudi Arabia officially announced the termination of diplomatic relations with the state of Qatar and suspending Qatari troops participating in the Saudi-led coalition in Yemen, the incident directly affected Jordan. Jordan is increasingly trapped in this diplomatic war when Saudi Arabia and the UAE ask other countries to follow their behavior as a form of solidarity (Harlow, 2017). The demands subsequently submitted by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia with its 13 allies, which generally order
Qatar to limit diplomatic relations with Iran; ending Turkey's military presence in Qatar; cut off all ties and funding for the "terrorist" organization or group, which is specifically mentioned, namely the Muslim Brotherhood, Al Qaeda, Islamic States, and Lebanese Hezbollah; shut down Al-Jazeera media station and other Qatari-funded news portals; ending interventions in the domestic affairs of other countries by cutting off contact with political opposition in Saudi Arabia, UAE, Egypt and Bahrain, and paying reparations and compensation for financial losses caused by Qatar’s policies. In order to comply with all these demands, Qatar will have its financial audit monitored for 10 years, and must agree to all claims within 10 days or the list will be canceled (Wintour, 2017).

Ahead of two days after the demands were published, on June 7, 2019 Jordan also announced their decision to reduce diplomatic ties with Qatar by withdrawing diplomats from their respective countries and revoking the license of the Al-Jazeera satellite channel located in Amman, according to a statement issued by the minister. Even though this behavior has received a lot of criticism from the public due to the beneficial relationship that has been owned by both parties, King Abdullah II still continues this decision (Jordan Times, 2017). This is because Jordan is very dependent on Saudi Arabia for economic and energy assistance. Saudi Arabia became a financial support for Jordan after Jordan’s economy began to deteriorate due to the increase in refugees who initially only came from Palestine but increased due to the Syrian Civil War. This is accompanied by public debt that reaches 94 percent of their country’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and high unemployment at 18.5 percent. In addition, pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which provided a loan worth US $ 723 million to the Jordan kingdom, forced the Jordanian Prime Minister Hani Mulki to compile drastic austerity measures in May 2018. This triggered a sizeable public protest by demanding that the government cancel plans to raise income taxes and cut subsidies for electricity, fuel and food (Agence France-Presse, 2018). So the government's dependence on foreign aid is very high. The royal response, which was limited to reducing relations, was seen by the coalition as an act of defiance and speculation by Jordanian officials was the main reason Saudi Arabia refused to renew its assistance in 2017. This in turn had a considerable impact on Jordan's ability to cope with the economic problems it faced (Furlow & Borgognone, 2018).

The cut that Saudi Arabia and its coalition proposed should only last six months. About 60 percent of Qatar’s trade transits through the UAE ports and Saudi border, so their isolation is expected to create a fatal disruption to Qatar’s survival. However, Qatar's ignorance of their requests to prolong the diplomatic crisis so that it reaches its third year in 2019 without progress. This situation is exacerbated by Qatar’s decision to normalize with Iran and further strengthen cooperation with Turkey. Even so, Saudi Arabia and other countries remain strong and still close their country’s borders, cut all air, sea and land routes, and end political and economic cooperation with Qatar (Habibi, 2019).
However, entering July 2019, one of the countries expressed its desire to re-create diplomatic relations with Qatar after two years of withdrawing its ambassador from the country, namely Jordan. This is shocking news as Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain and Egypt are still showing no sign of withdrawing from the sanctions imposed on Qatar. Even so, Jordan still appointed an ambassador, namely Zeid al-Lawzi, a Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to be stationed in Doha. On the other hand, the Qatari government also sent its delegation, Saud bin Nasser bin Jassem al Thani, a member of the royal family to the Jordanian capital, Amman (Salama, 2019). Therefore, based on the background of this problem, it can be seen that there is an interesting thing to study, namely Jordan’s reasons for restoring diplomatic relations with Qatar. This is an anomaly given that Qatar’s enmity with the four countries which severed diplomatic relations with it still continues, and in the long run it can have a significant effect on Jordan’s economy which is dependent on Saudi Arabia.

B. METHOD

Research was conducted using qualitative methods. With this qualitative method, researchers attempt to reveal the universal essence of phenomena personally experienced by a group of individuals in depth. There are two frameworks that can explain why Jordan decided to normalize their diplomatic relations with Qatar. The first framework explains that the external environment also influences, in this case the researcher uses the regional security complex theory to analyze the dynamics of the Middle East region. Buzan stated that a security complex can exist when a group of countries has primary security problems that are closely bound so that their national security cannot be separated from each other (Buzan & Waever, 2003). This can then create a regional security. Then the concept of a regional security complex emerged and the definition of RSC could then be developed further from the previous understanding of the region, so it means’ a set of units in which the processes of securitization, desecuritization, or both are closely tied so that their security problems cannot be analyzed or resolved separately from one another (Buzan & Waever, 2003).

To analyze the dynamics of an area, Buzan explained that there are four variables that make up the core structure of an RSC. First is the geographical conditions, which differentiate the complexity between each region, for example in Asia itself which can be divided into three different regional security complexes, namely in Southeast Asia, South Asia and East Asia and has separate cases. Second is Buzan’s view that the regional security complex is a replication of an anarchic structure at the local level, where there is a coexistence of two or more autonomous units, each of which has its own interests. The third is polarity which explains the distribution of power between each unit and how this shapes the policy direction of the countries in the region. The last is a social construction that describes the pattern of amity (friendship) and enmity between countries in the region. This pattern can be
reflected through the actions and interpretations of the countries when choosing to make alliances and fight in one region (Buzan & Waever, 2003).

The second framework explains how national identity as an internal factor can influence a country when making foreign policy. This research then emphasizes on the aspirational constructivism proposed by Anne Clunan. This theory emphasizes the correlation between how national identity is formed and its influence in constructing views of national interests which are then promoted by political elites. One of the core propositions of aspirational constructivism is how historical memory and the aspirations formed by it are crucial determinants in accepting an identity as a self-defining state. This shows that the agency plays a significant role in it (Clunan, 2005). For a country, its identity and national interest rests on two pillars, namely political goals and international status. Political goals include internal features and beliefs about the economic and political system of government that are appropriate for the state, while international status consists of the position of the state in the international hierarchy of power, be it political, military, and social (Clunan, 2009). Aspirational constructivism assumes that the political elite will then form a behavioral orientation towards cooperative action, competition, and confrontation with a country based on the context of self-image, which also consists of in-group and out-group constructs (Clunan, 2009).

C. RESULT AND DISCUSSION

1. The Effect of the Regional Security Complex on Jordanian Security

In order to understand the dynamics of security in the Middle East region, it is necessary to elaborate on the elements that differentiate it from others and the factors that create divergence in the region. This can be seen from the differences in the history of each country which affect the perception of security. After World War I, new states began to form in the Middle East which were formed under the supervision of their colonizers, Britain and France. This did not apply to Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Iran because they were not colonized. The involvement of external forces in the formation of this country is important to mention because it is the reason for the creation of conflict dynamics in these countries because modern borders are now previously determined by them (Klein, 2015). Particularly for the Middle East, Buzan & Waever characterized the security complex created by the colonialists' assistance as a form of "perennial conflict formation". This means that the interdependence that takes place in the Middle East is not a cooperative but a complex driven by conflict (Legrenzi, 2016).

This conflict formation is present due to the existence of a number of inter-regional relations in the Middle East. One of the things that best defines this area is centered in the Syrian region which consists of Egypt, Lebanon, Jordan, Iraq, Syria, Israel and Palestine. This region was formed on the basis of local problems between Israel and Palestine, which then spearheaded stronger hostility towards Israel by its neighbors, and subsequently the entire Arab community (Buzan & Waever, 2003). It
is also the basis of the six interregional wars that almost all countries in the Middle East participated in.

Indeed, the Arab-Israeli conflict defines how later Arab nationalism takes shape and then gives the Middle East as a whole its coherence as an RSC in the first place. The second interrelation is the Gulf region which is characterized by the rivalry between Iran, Iraq and the Arab Gulf countries which consist of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, UAE, and Oman. The main conflict in the region was when Iran and Saudi Arabia began to pursue hegemonic status in the Middle East by promoting their ideologies of opposing Arabism and Islamism. Although the later Sham and Gulf sub-complexes have different nuclei within the Middle East security complex, the issues that occur overlap. The same is the case with the last sub-complex, namely the state relations in the Maghreb region between Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Chad, and Western Sahara (Buzan & Waever, 2003). Although not too tied to other sub-complexes, the Tunisian conflict in 2011 had a domino effect throughout the Middle Eastern countries. So, like the definition of a security complex put forward by Buzan & Waever and the explanation above, the Middle East can be defined as a region consisting of countries with primary security problems that are so closely correlated that their national security cannot be separated from one another. So that to find out the dynamics of the RSC, it is necessary to analyze the agenda of the Middle East security complex.

Among other regions, the Middle East is said to have an autonomous level of regional security. Autonomy in this case means that despite the continuous heavy interference from external parties, the dynamics of the conflict taking place within the Middle East is an internal problem (Buzan & Waever, 2003). The development of Middle East regional security cooperation in the global contemporary history, especially after the Arab Spring, then significantly affected Jordan’s sustainability. The post-Arab Spring led to a profound structural transformation due to the fall of a number of regimes that had long supported these countries. This again led to major changes in cooperation and safety preferences, as well as a new Balance of Power. Apart from that, a major theme surrounding the instability of the Middle East region is the securitization of identity. This can be seen in the general objective of the alliance, which was motivated by the division of Sunnis and Shiites (Halliday, 2005). In addition, there are many insurgent groups present because sectarian divisions dominate security issues in the Middle East and create a new security problem, namely 'human security' with the increase in refugees. According to Eljertsen (2018) the security issues that shaped regional cooperation in the previous period with the present, post Arab Spring is a continuation or intensification of the previous security issue, namely the Israeli-Palestinian conflict which re-emerged after US President Donald Trump proposed a new solution, the role of identity, and the struggle for sovereignty.

So the security complex presented by the Middle East then influenced Jordan significantly as a country that is located in a central position in the dynamics of the region. This can be analyzed using four elements, first, namely the border where
Jordan is surrounded by countries of conflict, Syria, Iraq, Israel, and Palestine. As previously mentioned, the new security issue that emerged after the Arab Spring, represents the urgency of human security that has increased with the escalation of war. Human security is defined by Lynch (2013), as liberating humans from intense, extensive, and prolonged threats that make their lives and freedom vulnerable. One of the cases that made this idea central was the war in Syria which broke out in March 2011. At first, this conflict was just an insurgency aimed at overthrowing the Assad regime but then transitioned to a civil war and has not been resolved. This was also influenced by a number of state and non-state actors who intervened to make this war prolonged. So after more than eight years, this war has resulted in an estimated 560,000 deaths and the spread of 12 million refugees throughout the world which then presents the urgency of the global refugee issue, but intensely to the Middle East security complex (Alshoubaki & Harris, 2018).

The second element is the structure of anarchy, which is said by Waltz (in Gause III, 1999) to be the main driver of alliance behavior in the Middle East. Without a major authority in the order of the international political system, with these conditions each country forced to develop a balancing alliance so that its independence and existence are not threatened. Furthermore, with the structure of anarchy, the third element shows that there is polarity in the Middle East. At first the power competition was dominated by Saudi Arabia and Iran. However, this dynamic is increasingly changing with the presence of Israel which shows an assertive approach to other Arab countries after the leadership of Benyamin Netanyahu and the rise of Turkey under Recep Tayyip Erdogan. For Jordan itself, this polarity closely affects its policy, due to its position as only a middle power so that it requires cooperation for its sustainability. In particular, the polarity of power on Saudi Arabia due to its oil wealth has long dominated Jordan’s policy direction since its independence. Then the fourth element is amity and enmity. As a result of Jordan’s slumping economy, he constructed his friendship and enmity using a pragmatic lens.

2. Jordan National Identity Analysis of Alliance Selection

The next reason Jordan carried out restoration with Qatar was a factor in the country’s national identity since its inception in 1921. The establishment of Jordan by British colonialists was the result of the defeat of the Hashimite family in defending the Hijaz (now Saudi Arabia) which is home to two of the greatest Islamic sites, namely Mecca and Medina (Paris, 2004). Losing this position which was also the legitimacy of the Hashimite family as descendants of the Prophet Muhammad then became an impetus for King Abdullah I to have the ambition of expansionism which was pursued by absorbing new territories in Jordan’s political and national structure, one of which was Jerusalem. Jerusalem was later successfully obtained in the first Arab-Israeli war by annexing the West Bank. Abdullah sought to broaden the notion of a Jordanian identity to be consistent with the geopolitical situation, and this was done through the creation of a symbolic-political position, namely as 'Protector of
Jerusalem’ (Silverburg, 2006). Jordan’s efforts to change the city’s status are said to be successful according to the British record of recording Jordan’s symbolic actions in Jerusalem, such as renovating the holy sites of the Dome of the Rock and restoring the Al-Aqsa Mosque, resolving Christian strife, holding the annual Isra ‘celebration. Mi’raj by inviting Muslim and Arab leaders from all over the world, and organizing the Papal Pilgrimage (Silverburg, 2006).

Legitimacy of Jordan’s position in Jerusalem then came in concrete form in the 1994 Israel-Jordan peace agreement. In that agreement article 9, Israel recognizes Jordan’s historic right in Jerusalem, particularly in the protection and supervision of Islamic holy sites. Israel agrees to “give high priority” to Jordan regarding Jerusalem when negotiating the permanent status of the city with the Palestinian authorities, if it reaches that point (Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1994). Jordan’s position was further consolidated after in 2013, under the leadership of King Abdullah II, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas signed an agreement in Amman that reaffirmed the King’s protective status of holy sites in Jerusalem, and declared that King Abdullah II had the right to use all legal remedies. to protect it, especially the Al-Aqsa Mosque (Jerusalem Post, 2013). This agreement revived the Jordanian identity in Jerusalem and was continued to be defended by King Abdullah II amidst Middle East upheaval in the 21st century and attempts to wrest the patron status of Jerusalem from Jordan.

However, Trump’s December 2017 statement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital and planning the allocation of the US Embassy to Israel from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem sparked longstanding hostilities and claims of historical legitimacy on the site. Jordan’s concern lies in longstanding hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Jordan that began to re-emerge in December 2017, two weeks before the US issued an official statement regarding Jerusalem, with the Saudis reiterating their intention to challenge Hashimiyah’s protective status. The presentation was made at the Arab Inter-Parliamentary Union meeting by a Saudi delegation who insulted Jordan by rejecting the mention of Jordan’s historical role in relation to Jerusalem in the draft document (Ziadat, 2017). For the sake of smoothing this goal, the Saudi crown prince has intensified the restoration of Saudi-Israeli relations by inviting several other Gulf countries such as Bahrain and the UAE. This recovery came with the issuance of the US peace plan, the Deal of the Century in 2019. The Deal of the Century itself is a document drafted by Jared Kushner, Trump’s senior adviser, which was officially announced at the US-sponsored peace conference in Bahrain in June 2019. , as a peace plan to end the long conflict between Palestine and Israel. The main point of the agreement gives Israel the right to have complete sovereignty over Jerusalem. It is a fear for Jordan that there is a possibility that the Saudis, with US and Israeli support, will set up an administration of the Islamic holy sites in Jerusalem which will be under Saudi supervision. This event could reduce Palestinian authority in Jerusalem affairs, as well as effectively cancel Jordan’s protective status of Jerusalem (TRT World, 2019). In response, Jordan has moved swiftly to form alliances for regional support and to become increasingly involved with Jerusalem issues. Some
of the alliances that were intensified were Turkey, Morocco, and one of them Qatar, which also emphasized the importance of uniting full Arab support for Hashimiyah’s protective status (Albawaba, 2019).

In analyzing how then the patron status of Jerusalem affects Jordan’s foreign policy, the theory of aspirational constructivism can be used. As previously explained, the core proposition of this theory is the influence of historical memory and expectations in perceiving an identity as a self-defining state. However, this self-image can only be accepted as a national identity if it is a collective identity, because this collective group plays a role in incorporating it into the thinking of the people of the country. Jordan’s own national self-image is described by its leadership as being the protector of one of the holy sites for the three religions, Judaism, Christianity and Islam, namely Jerusalem. This leadership is also legitimized domestically and internationally because of Jordan’s contribution to the maintenance and maintenance of the sites within the Holy City. This self-image was later accepted as a component of Jordan’s national identity because of the existence of a collective group, namely the Hashimite monarchy, which integrated it in political discourse and disseminated it to society as state values and norms.

Then according to Clunan’s statement, if then this self-image can dominate political discourse, that image will be institutionalized in domestic law and regulations as well as bonds and behavior norms in relations with other countries. A self-image then becomes dominant if for a long time it can survive and be recognized by the international community. So in this case, Jordan’s self-image as the protector of Jerusalem becomes dominant because it is accepted by the international community and despite experiencing turmoil in the process, this self-image has continued to stick after Jordan was founded in 1922 until now. Once accepted, this self-image will define the country’s national interest and form the in-group and outgroup construction. The existence of this construction affects their choice of behavioral orientation to a country through amity and enmity patterns. Jordan then defines their ingroup as a country that recognizes and supports it as the protector of Jerusalem, so the alliance needs to be preserved and defended. Meanwhile, countries that threaten the existence of this self-image are categorized as out-groups, such as Israel, the US, and recently Saudi Arabia that threaten Jordan’s protective position.

**D. CONCLUSION**

Based on the explanation above, the researchers found that the motive underlying Jordan’s actions to restore relations with Qatar was its identity as the protector of Jerusalem. In understanding this motive, the researcher uses Anne Clunan’s level of analysis of national identity, namely aspirational constructivism, especially in one of Jordan’s aspirations, namely as a protector of the holy sites of Islam and Christianity in Jerusalem. This protective status is integral to the identity of Jordan and Hashimiyyah due to the political discourse that was instigated by the founder of Jordan’s first, namely King Abdullah. So that Jerusalem is considered as the legitimacy of their religion in the international realm which shows its importance.
in the holy city of the three religions. This self-image in turn influences Jordan's foreign policy because it constructs a pattern of friendship and hostility based on this Jerusalem identity. So Jordan will be more inclined to associate with a country that supports this protective status, especially after the Deal of the Century agreement comes out. In this case, Saudi Arabia opposes this status and wants to compete with Jordan for Jerusalem, while Qatar emphasizes the interests of Jordan and gives political support to this status. Therefore, it can be explained why in the end Jordan continued to make an alliance with Qatar even though its relationship with Saudi Arabia was also threatened.

REFERENCES